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ABSTRACT
Is a Viable Theistic Program of Psychological Research Possible?
Michael Zhang
Department of Psychology, BYU
Master of Science
This thesis explores whether a viable theistic program of psychological research is
possible. The importance of this exploration has to do with naturalism's bad monopoly
on psychological science, inasmuch as naturalism prevents other worldviews from
competing fairly in psychology’s scientific marketplace by controlling the criteria of
psychological science. Because theism is naturalism's most complete rival, considering
theism's scientific potential in psychology is crucial to dismantling naturalism's bad
monopoly. Contrary to conventional wisdom, theism encompasses a unique set of
understandings about the natural events that constitute the discipline of psychology.
Therefore, a robust scientific conception of theism would change how psychological
researchers understand and utilize existing research methods and psychological topics.
Not only are quantitative and qualitative methods capable of theistic deployment;
traditionally theistic topics and radically secular topics within psychology can also be
reconceptualized and investigated theistically. Indeed, theistic reconceptualizations of
psychological theories and topics lead to new and different research questions,
hypotheses, and predictions as well as original studies and prospective programs of
research, suggesting that theism is heuristic for the discipline of psychology in its current
constitution. A viable theistic program of psychological research is not only possible, but
also necessary for psychological science.

Keywords: psychological science, naturalism, theism, worldviews, psychological
research, methods, topics
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1
Is a Viable Theistic Program of Psychological Research Possible?
Some recent efforts to expand the purview of psychological science have ventured
into an unprecedented theistic territory. These efforts have led many psychologists and
scholars to wonder about what a truly theistic approach to psychology might entail, i.e., a
psychology that assumes a functionally relevant God. For example, Richards and Bergin
(2004, 2005), Slife, Stevenson, and Wendt (2010), York (2009), and O’Grady (2012)
have explored the possibility of theistic psychotherapeutic practices; Slife and Reber
(2009a), Slife, Reber, and Lefevor (2012), and Nelson and Thomason (2012) have
considered theistic approaches to psychological theorizing; Slife and Whoolery (2006)
and Johnson (2007) have attempted to formulate a theistic philosophy of science for
psychology; and Melling (2009, 2013), Slife and Reber (2009b), and Slife et al. (2012)
have begun laying the groundwork for a theistic program of psychological research, with
Slife et al. (2012) and Slife and Zhang (2014) bringing together the various branches of
the theistic research project.
These proposals for a theistic approach to psychology beg an important question:
can it really be done? Can these explorations be translated into an approach that allows
for a theistic science of human psychology? More specifically, is a viable theistic
program of psychological research possible? If such a program of research were
possible, it would have important implications for psychological science and for the
discipline of psychology in general. Indeed, a whole new program of research and
practice would be opened for exploration, possibly yielding new insights into the nature
of humans, behavior, and therapy.
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In fact, Reber, Slife, and Downs (2012) have already begun to consider the
answers to these timely questions and have demonstrated the preliminary fruitfulness and
significance of a theistic approach to psychological research and scientific investigation.
They describe two demonstration studies in their article that clearly seem to indicate the
possibility of theistic research. Their first example shows how existing research can be
tweaked to accommodate theistic hypotheses and explanations. Reber et al. make some
modifications to an existing line of psychological research, illustrating how a theistic
framework can generate new possibilities for investigating a conventional research topic.
Their second example shows how theism can also spawn an entirely original program of
psychological research, as well as new scientific instruments. This foray into theistic
research leads Reber et al. to conclude that “…theistic programs of research have great
heuristic potential, suggesting a whole host of possible hypotheses and research
studies...” (p. 210).
However, they have yet to develop a comprehensive program of theistic
psychological research, or thoroughly outline the contours of such a program, making
observers wonder if an actual, heuristic program is really possible. One way to determine
whether a viable theistic program of psychological research is possible is simply to set up
theistically-informed studies and let the findings speak for themselves. Not only would
this be a relatively unguided approach, however, it could also prove contrary to one of the
primary justifications of a theistic approach to psychology, i.e., that findings are not
capable of speaking for themselves (Slife et al., 2012).
Perhaps a better approach—one that is more disciplined and the one I will adopt
in this thesis—is, first, an extensive treatment of the theoretical issues at play in raising
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the title question, which would provide sufficient justification for exploring theism’s
scientific potential in psychology, followed by a practical rendering and application of
theism in a prospective program of psychological research. Some preliminary theoretical
work (Slife & Reber, 2009b; Slife et al., 2012), in this regard, has already been done, and
a few prototypical conceptual and practical demonstrations have been made (Melling,
2009, 2013; Reber et al., 2012; York, 2012; Bishop, 2012), but a forward-looking
program of research that is capable of cutting across several subdisciplines of psychology
has not yet been outlined. Thus, this thesis will be different from what has been
previously accomplished because it explores whether theism is sufficiently justified as an
alternative scientific worldview in psychology and develops a prospective, practical
program of research with which to move forward.
Such a prospective program is apropos because the main consumers of
psychological information and services, whether in books or in counseling, are theists
(Richards & Bergin, 2005; Reber, 2006; Vogel, Gerdin & McMinn, 2012; Reber et al.,
2012, O’Grady, 2012); perhaps, for the first time, this population will be able to engage
with a psychology that takes their preferred worldview seriously in its studies and
practices. As Reber et al. (2012) put it, “Given the large number of theists, including
theistic psychologists, theistic psychology students, theistic therapy clients, and theistic
research participants, it appears to us to be potentially worthwhile and even important to
put theistic hypotheses and theories to the test” (p. 210). In view of the significance of
these implications, it seems prudent to explore whether a theistic approach to psychology
can sustain a viable, and extensive, program of research (Slife & Reber, 2009b) that has
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applicability to mainstream theories, methods, and topics. The purpose of the present
project is to embark on this very exploration.
Undertaking this project requires me first to analyze, in this thesis, the
monopolistic status of the current philosophy, or worldview, undergirding psychological
science: naturalism. This analysis is needed in order to assess whether theism should be
considered as a plausible additional worldview to the current dominance of the
naturalistic worldview in guiding psychological science. If there is sufficient justification
for theism to serve as an additional scientific worldview in psychology, it would be
important to consider whether theism can bring new or different research findings to
light, and thus add to psychology’s encyclopedia. Therefore, I also explore whether
theism is different enough from naturalism to warrant its inclusion as another guiding
philosophy for psychological research. Many researchers presently assume that the
findings generated by naturalistic methods sufficiently explain the psychology of all
humans (Reber & Slife, 2013a), regardless of their worldview orientation, so it is
important to describe how theistic modes of inquiry might be uniquely heuristic for
psychological research.
Thus, following this discussion, I elucidate ways in which theism could alter
conventional modes of psychological inquiry while retaining the use of existing
psychological research methods. Furthermore, by utilizing these various ways in which
theism offers an alternative research framework that redirects the deployment of
quantitative and qualitative methods, I attempt to conceptualize a prospective program of
practical research in developmental psychology as an applied exemplar of theistic
psychological research. My chief objective for this thesis is to scrupulously follow the
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assumptions and concepts of the theistic worldview, while working within some of the
existing parameters of the psychological enterprise, such as method and subdiscipline, to
see if I can give form to a prospective program of psychological research that makes
conceptual, methodological, scientific, and practical sense to engage in. At the same
time, the rationale and context for exploring the title question of this thesis will be clearly
conveyed in this attempt to offer the most compelling answer yet.
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Chapter 1: Does Psychological Science Need Alternative Worldviews Like Theism?
This opening chapter considers the fundamental question that must be adequately
addressed before attempting any conceptualization of a theistic program of psychological
research: “Does psychological science need alternative worldviews like theism?” Only if
this question is answered affirmatively can a theistic program of research be justifiably
considered. The problem with posing such a question, however, and the challenge to
attempting to answer it affirmatively, is that most scholars and psychological scientists
already believe they have answered this question quite convincingly, and that the answer
is “no” (Johnson, 1990a; Starks, 2014; Helminiak, 2010). To them, time would be better
spent simply doing psychological science instead of reflecting on what philosophically
questionable aspects might undergird that science (Provine, 1990). As I will show in this
chapter, understanding exactly what kind of science psychologists are doing is absolutely
warranted as there are many such philosophically questionable aspects, and each is
directly concerned with naturalism.
Thus, I begin this chapter by exploring what makes naturalism as successful as it
is. Appropriately applying naturalism in a scientific context in psychology requires
recognizing the extent to which it is a worldview rather than the natural world itself.
Therefore, I expose the implications of naturalism’s worldview status. Next, I consider
reasons for theism’s candidacy as not only another potential scientific worldview for
psychology, but also perhaps the one deserving of most urgent consideration. Finding
these reasons to be compelling, I will also examine the credibility of the common
objections levied against theism’s worldview candidacy by responding to a string of
claims that, both independently and taken together as a whole, color theism as inferior or

7
problematic compared to naturalism. I examine each of these claims in turn, showing
that naturalism can be subjected to all of the same criticisms, and then further consider
theism’s status as a viable worldview candidate for psychological science by showing
why psychological science might need the kind of worldview comparison that theism
would allow for.
Naturalism’s Success: Good or Bad Monopoly?
Naturalism is a system of ideas based on the premise that natural laws sufficiently
explain the natural world (i.e., lawfulness), and therefore the supernatural need not be
considered (i.e., godlessness) (Slife et al., 2012; Slife & Whoolery, 2006). Despite
originating in the natural sciences, it has spurred countless successful programs of
psychological research after being imported into modern scientific psychology (Johnson
& Watson, 2012). It is so successful, in fact, that it could be said to have a monopoly on
psychological science (Johnson & Watson, 2012; O’Grady & York, 2012; Slife & Zhang,
2014). While naturalism is to be highly commended as a consistent and constructive
system of guiding scientific ideas for psychology, monopolies are not always a good
thing. As Read (1960) put it in economic terms, “There are two ways to attain an
exclusive position in the market, that is to say, there are two ways to achieve monopoly.
One way is not only harmless—indeed, it is beneficial [good]; the other is bad. The
beneficial way is to become superior to everyone else in providing some good or service.
The bad way is to use coercive force to keep others from competing effectively and also
from challenging one’s position” (para. 5).
To illustrate this distinction clearer, consider the contrast between the following
two notable historical examples of U.S. monopolies: Standard Oil and U.S. Steel.
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Rockefeller’s monopoly on the oil industry was initially deemed a good monopoly, to use
Read’s terms, because (his) Standard Oil Company was efficient and responsible, rising
above the competition (Beattie, n.d.). Standard Oil used waste products such as gasoline
to fuel its machines rather than pumping it into rivers like its competitors did, and even
turned industrial waste into new products such as Vaseline and synthetic beeswax
(Beattie, n.d.). In these ways, Standard Oil benefited not only the economy but also the
environment; the competition, in the early years, was utterly bested because of Standard
Oil’s sheer excellence and superiority. Standard Oil’s initial rise to excellence suggests
all the features of a good monopoly.
Consider U.S. Steel on the other hand, which was originally considered a bad
monopoly. While a good monopoly competes fairly because of its excellence, a bad
monopoly competes unfairly by controlling the criteria by which it is judged. The
formation of the United States Steel Corporation via merger by the likes of Carnegie,
Morgan, and Schwab has been widely viewed as indicative of a bad monopoly (Beattie,
n.d.; Reback, 2007) because U.S. Steel “exerted market power over the steel industry”
(Reback, 2007, p. 105). Market power is characterized by “a firm’s ability to raise prices
without provoking an adverse competitive response” (McCraw & Reinhardt, 1989, p.
601). It creates, in other words, a non-competitive market structure (Parsons & Ray,
1975), where competitors have no way of competing fairly. After its merger, U.S. Steel
began price fixing and this resulted in an increase in profits because it had control of the
market and thus the judgments made of its quality; in other words, U.S. Steel could
“justify” its sharp price increases with its prominent position.

9
This sort of price fixing suggests a bad monopoly because, as Reback (2007) put
it, “If U.S. Steel had only been a more efficient competitor, then the competitor’s stock
prices would have reacted negatively as the more efficient U.S. Steel captured some of
their business, which would have reduced their profits [i.e., good monopoly]” (p. 113).
However, the competitors’ profits actually increased (Reback, 2007), which could only
happen “when a monopolistic U.S. Steel was able to increase the price of steel by
controlling the market [i.e., bad monopoly]” (p. 113). Because U.S. Steel prevented early
competitors from challenging its market position and competing fairly with it (Parsons &
Ray, 1975; Reback, 2007), it was considered a bad monopoly. In other words, U.S. Steel
did not eliminate its competition through excellence, as a good monopoly does; rather, it
controlled the criteria (e.g., price) by which its competitors were judged, making it a bad
monopoly.
In the case of naturalism and psychological science, this “monopoly” metaphor
emphasizing fair competition is especially appropriate because naturalism’s dominance
could actually be good for psychological science by eliminating unproductive
competitors through excellence, and this metaphor takes that possibility into account.
The other way of understanding and challenging dominance—the commonly adopted
“power” metaphor emphasizing equality (Johnson & Watson, 2012; Slife & Zhang, 2014;
O’Grady & York, 2012)—frames naturalism’s dominance not as success but as
“hegemony,” “ideology,” “dogmatism,” “prejudice,” “dictatorship,” “marginalization,”
“oppression,” and “totalitarianism” (see, e.g., Johnson & Watson, 2012; Slife & Zhang,
2014; O’Grady & York, 2012). This metaphor originates from the critical psychology
tradition that tends to view the possession of power as necessarily problematic (Fox,
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Prilleltensky & Austin, 2009). That is to say, naturalism’s dominance represents a power
differential that must be overturned or rebalanced for the sake of equality. Naturalism’s
dominance, from this perspective, is always bad for psychological science. Therefore,
the “power” metaphor automatically discounts naturalism’s success.
While this metaphor is used by many commentators such as critical psychologists
to frame critiques of naturalism’s influence on psychological science (Fox et al., 2009;
Johnson & Watson, 2012; O’Grady & York, 2012), it is not critical enough in that it
dismisses naturalism’s success on the basis of power. These commentators do not take
into account the possibility of the powerful being excellent and benevolent, like Standard
Oil was in the beginning. In this sense, the “monopoly” metaphor is better than the
“power” metaphor because it does not assume on an a priori basis that being powerful is
wrong. After all, Standard Oil’s position of power was earned through efficiency and
excellence and it did a whole lot of good for the economy and environment; just because
something is powerful does not mean it is not benevolent and excellent. Naturalism
could very well fit that description as well, so the “monopoly” metaphor is preferable
because it considers that naturalism’s success could be a good thing or a bad thing for
psychological science.
Framing naturalism and psychological science with the “monopoly” metaphor is a
more even-handed approach that investigates naturalism’s success more critically than
the “power” metaphor.

Naturalism’s extraordinary success would cause the most

critical of observers to wonder about the viability of the conditions surrounding,
supporting, and sustaining its success in the scientific market of psychology, and to raise
questions about the kind of influence naturalism has on psychological science in order to
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determine whether naturalism has a good or bad monopoly on psychological science.
These observers would question how naturalism’s monopolistic status was achieved: Did
it succeed by rising above competitors in a fair psychological marketplace of scientific
ideas like Standard Oil (good monopoly) or did it come to this monopolistic status using
market power and control like U.S. Steel (bad monopoly)? In other words, has
naturalism been adequately tested, compared, and challenged against other possible
scientific frameworks for psychology (good monopoly) or has it succeeded solely under
its own set of conditions for success that prevent competitors from competing fairly with
it (bad monopoly)? Put more simply another way, has naturalism earned (good
monopoly) or enforced (bad monopoly) its monopolistic status?
The importance of this series of questions has to do with the very definition of
psychological science. Naturalism has come to be identified with psychological science
so that psychological science that is not naturalistic is actually not considered scientific.
The National Academy of Sciences seems to support this sentiment in their statement that
“the most basic characteristic of science [is] reliance upon naturalistic explanations”
(Johnson, 1990a, 18). This, according to Johnson (1990a), means that “science by
definition is based upon naturalism” (p. 19). The identification or confounding of
naturalism with psychological science, however, could prove to be particularly
problematic if Johnson (1990a) is correct in his appraisal of naturalism as a “highly
controversial philosophical presupposition” (p. 15), to the extent “that it obscures its own
untested presuppositions [whereby its] values and assumptions are ‘the way of science’ or
axiomatic’” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 14). This a priori identification of naturalism with
psychological science, and the general unawareness of naturalists about their own
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assumptions (Reber & Slife, 2013a, Slife et al. 2012), means that naturalism has not been
compared against other possible scientific frameworks for psychology since it
automatically rules out all such possibilities as unscientific (Johnson, 1990a), thus
making comparison unnecessary. That is to say, the confounding of naturalism with
psychological science prevents the existence or growth of a fair marketplace of scientific
ideas in psychology, not allowing alternative frameworks to compete, and thus making
naturalism a bad monopoly like U.S. Steel originally was. Naturalism’s influence on
psychological science, in other words, is akin to price fixing, in that it controls the
scientific marketplace of psychology and therefore judgments of research quality in that
marketplace.
It is not surprise then that naturalism is considered psychological “science’s
central dogma” (Leahey, 1991, p. 379). Indeed, “naturalism’s propensity toward
dogmatism” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 14) has led most psychologists to provide only
naturalistic explanations and interpretations when they study natural events and processes
in their scientific attempts to understand and explain psychological phenomena (Slife &
Reber, 2009a). This approach to psychological science has become so dogmatic that an
exclusive focus on methods and topics that are natural coupled with naturalistic
understanding and interpretation is largely considered the only way of performing
respectable and rigorous scientific investigation in psychology. In this sense, naturalism
has a bad monopolistic claim upon psychological science, exerting a clear,
unchallengeable, dominance that allows it to legislate “in advance… that only naturalistic
explanations of phenomena be considered acceptable” (Larmer, 2012, p. 135). As
Johnson (1990a) notes, “The problem with scientific naturalism as a worldview is that it
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takes a sound methodological premise of natural science and transforms it into a
dogmatic statement about the nature of the universe” (p. 21).
Despite these criticisms, many are quick to point out that “The reason that
naturalism is preferred by psychological scientists is because it works” (Provine, 1990, p.
24, emphasis added), and that it is perfectly reasonable that naturalism has a monopoly on
psychological science, and not at all dogmatic. In other words, Provine and others like
him are making a Standard Oil claim about naturalism, indicating that naturalism is a
good monopoly because it is benevolent and excellent, all the while being open and fair
to scientific competitors yet maintaining that because it works it is the single best
scientific alternative for psychology. There is no doubt that naturalism is very successful
in psychological science. It has produced findings that have allowed for extraordinary
modern progress such as “the development of new technologies and tools” (Reber &
Slife, 2013a, p. 14). Thus, it not only “works” but is also “useful” and “productive” (p.
14). However, as Reber and Slife note, such notions are “meanings, understood in terms
derived from [naturalism]” (p. 14). That is, naturalism defines what it means when
something “works” or is “useful” or “productive.”
It is important to note, in this regard, that there are no universal criteria for
scientific success, much in the same way that there are no universal criteria for social,
political, or economic success: success depends on the particular frame in which it is
conceived, viewed, and measured. In economics, for example, rational choice theory has
typically determined what economic success means, such that only consumer decisions
reflecting an instrumental rationality, such as getting more for less or getting the best
deal, are considered economically successful (Scott, 2000). This framework for success
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implies that consumer decisions motivated by emotion and sentiment at the expense of
“rational choice,” such as paying top dollar for name brands, are not successful economic
decisions per se. But consumers are often equally if not more satisfied when they buy
name brands and they frequently make purchases of this kind (Murray, 2013). This
suggests that there may not be any universal criteria for economic success, or perhaps any
sort of success, because success is interpreted and understood within a particular,
preexisting framework.
In naturalism’s case, it has set the conditions for and the definitions of what it
means to be scientifically successful. Consider, for example, one of naturalism’s
defining features—natural lawfulness—and its influence upon the scientific principle of
replicability. Natural laws imply that the world operates in the same ways everywhere,
every time, and with every one (Slife & Whoolery, 2006), meaning that the more a
study’s findings are replicated, the more successful those findings are. Laws are
inherently replicable in this naturalistic sense, and therefore the scientific requirement of
replicability assumes they are most important for scientific success. Because the lawful is
regular and repeatable across all contexts, the success of finding laws depends on their
repeatability and thus replicability in scientific studies. Therefore, as one psychology
textbook author put it, “We shouldn’t place too much stock in a psychological finding
until it’s been replicated” (Lilienfeld et al., 2013, p. 24, emphasis in the original).
However, by emphasizing replicability in this naturalistic way, certain phenomena
and events will automatically be regarded as less than scientific or pseudoscientific
because they are not easily replicable. For example, rigorous studies of paranormal
phenomena often produce startling, significant, singular findings, but because they are
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not replicable, they are not considered successful or real because of naturalism’s criterion
for scientific success: “As researchers of extra-sensory perception (ESP) can attest, a lack
of replicablity is construed by psychologists as a lack of real or ultimate existence” (Slife
& Whoolery, 2006, p. 223). In other words, the lawfulness criterion of naturalism is used
to frame its own notion of what it means to be scientifically successful—replicability, in
this case. This is the reason parapsychology is often considered pseudoscientific
(Lilienfeld et al. 2013), and even unscientific. In fact, in many introductory psychology
textbooks, the proper approach to psychological science is contrasted to pseudoscience
with scientific characteristics defined in terms of naturalistic assumptions (Lilienfeld et
al., 2013; Starks, 2014) or the criteria naturalism controls.
Hence, naturalistic scientific success can only be understood in naturalistic terms.
The upshot is this is not the same as scientific success per se. Therefore, naturalism can
lead to scientific accomplishments, and can claim to be successful in this way, but it is
not itself a scientific accomplishment. When you frame both the criteria for success and
the investigation to take place (e.g., method), there is a stacked deck or rigged game that
always allows you to “win.” This point is important because it suggests that the
monopolistic claim naturalism has on psychological science is enforced by unfair
preclusion (bad monopoly) rather than earned by fair comparison (good monopoly).
Until naturalism is subjected to a fair test, it will remain a bad monopoly for
psychological science.
This fair test can only be one of comparison or competition with other
philosophies or frameworks, much like in a fair economic marketplace, since no
framework can be subjected to its own conditions for testing (Slife et al., 2012). Such
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competition is necessary to bring a fair psychological marketplace of scientific ideas into
existence and in order to break up naturalism’s bad monopoly that is detrimental to the
market. How exactly can naturalism be appropriately tested and compared with other
possible scientific frameworks in psychology to bring about fair competition? The key to
accomplishing this task lies in first recognizing the extent to which naturalism is a
worldview.
The Worldview of Naturalism
Naturalism’s bad monopoly is also partly the result of its improper identification
with the objective natural world. This identification happens at the methodological and
the metaphysical levels. The methods of naturalistic psychological science are assumed
by many to be neutral, “transparent and unbiased windows to the real objective world”
(Slife et al., 2012, p. 215). These methods are thought to map the natural world as it is,
utilizing a “neutral or universal logic that attempts to sweep away the subjective elements
of human experience, such as biases and assumptions, to reveal the uninterpreted,
assumptionless objective world” (p. 215). At the methodological level, naturalism
supposedly allows for the “uninterpreted reality of the natural world” (p. 215) to be made
apparent.
Similarly, there is also a metaphysical manifestation of naturalism’s identification
with the natural world. Naturalistic realism is an appropriate way of describing this
manifestation because to many psychological scientists naturalism is not just an approach
or philosophical system that guides scientific investigation and method; rather, the world
is, as a matter of fact, naturalistic (Slife et al., 2012); in other words, the world is actually
naturalistic in nature. It is an objective reality that the neutral naturalistic method can
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make known to everybody. This coupling of naturalism with the objective world is
another reason psychological studies are often relegated to methods and topics that are
natural. Not surprisingly, “the success of natural science methods and the belief that they
lead to the greatest possible objectivity… has led naturalist human scientists to be
especially susceptible to dogmatism…” (Johnson & Watson, 2012, p. 270).
The mistaken association of naturalism with objectivity has resulted in a general
reification of naturalism as both a methodological framework and a metaphysical
premise. In actuality, however, naturalism is a worldview through and through, “not the
natural, or even a compendium of the natural” (Reber & Slife, 2013, p. 11); it is not the
natural world itself, nor does it provide unbiased access to this world. Rather, the
worldview of naturalism “is a particular way of looking at the world that is guided by
systems of assumptions, values, and meanings that say at least as much about the
adherents of the worldview as they do the objects of the world” (p. 13). In this sense,
naturalism is no more or less objective than any other worldview, because all worldviews
are equally constituted by both the person holding the worldview and the world that is
viewed, i.e., “by both subjectivity and objectivity in an interpreted reality” (p. 11).
It is important to recognize that despite naturalism’s pervasiveness, dominance,
success, and tone-setting nature in psychological science, the world is only naturalistic
inasmuch as psychological scientists frame it in such a way. As much as many
psychological scientists might think that their activities are guided by the proper
understanding of reality, this understanding can be at best an interpreted reality.
Consequently, psychological phenomena are natural events that are supposedly governed
by natural laws according to the worldview of the naturalist, i.e., his or her interpretation
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of or system of assumptions about the world (Harris, 2004; Slife & Reber, 2009a; Reber
& Slife, 2013a). While many might hold that governance by natural laws is not simply a
worldview, that it is supported by data, data does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, data are
collected under a pre-established method that already assumes the world is a certain way
(Slife et al., 2012), and interpreted or made sense of under the same worldview that
guided its collection. Thus, natural events, including their regularity, could, in principle,
also be interpreted in other ways, through alternative worldviews, but worldviews other
than naturalism have not been seriously considered or put to the test yet in psychological
science (Slife et al., 2012; Slife & Zhang, 2014).
This non-consideration of alternative worldviews has created a problem in
contemporary psychology, where the naturalistic worldview is “taken for granted” (Slife
et al. 2012, p. 217) as “the way we think today” (Johnson, 1990a, p. 21) and “the air that
we breathe” (Johnson & Watson, 2012; p. 271). Therefore, it is not as easily recognized
as a worldview compared to other worldviews. The largely unexamined and
unquestioned dominance of the naturalistic framing of the world in psychological science
makes it impossible to know if the world really is naturalistic, or whether naturalism is
indeed the best scientific worldview, because it is never compared to other worldviews,
conceptually or practically. According to Slife et al. (2012), such comparison is vital
because “Only alternative method worldviews make the evaluation of method
assumptions possible. They contrast with and thus expose these implicit assumptions,
allowing them to be compared pragmatically and thus evaluated for their usefulness” (p.
221).
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This kind of comparison is necessary for fair competition in the scientific
marketplace of psychology. If naturalism is not compared against other worldviews, the
bad monopoly that is the status quo will remain unchallenged and hold psychological
science back in some ways. Fair competition can only come about by allowing
competitors into the marketplace to “rise or fall on [their] own merits to the discipline”
(Slife & Zhang, 2014, p. 1946). In order to level the scientific playing field of
psychology, so to speak (Slife & Gantt, 1999), it would be important to explore the
scientific potential of other worldviews, in addition to naturalism, as all worldviews are
equally value-laden and rife with subjectivity and no one worldview should be
scientifically privileged above the rest prior to the systematic investigation, application,
and comparison of other worldviews in the scientific market of psychology. As Slife and
Zhang (2014) put it, “What is needed now is a chance for [alternative worldviews] to
compete fairly in the marketplace of psychological and scientific ideas” (p. 1945).
Historically, in fact, worldviews other than naturalism have led to many
respectable modes of inquiry and types of knowledge (Harris, 2004; Johnson & Watson,
2012), but psychological science has mainly operated on the basis of a naturalistic
worldview and has rarely acknowledged the epistemological merit of alternative
worldviews (Johnson & Watson, 2012). This is not only further evidence of naturalism’s
bad monopoly on psychological science; perhaps, more importantly, it suggests that if
alternative worldviews could also have the potential to advance knowledge (Harris, 2004,
Johnson & Watson, 2012), like naturalism, then psychological science may benefit from
their consideration. After all, as Watson and Johnson (2012) observe, “there are many
worldview beliefs that appear to be logically and empirically compatible with the
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universe within which we live” (p. 271). Thus, to challenge naturalism’s bad monopoly,
“a fair accommodation of competing worldviews” is needed (Johnson, 1990a, p. 19).
“Fair competition, however, is easier said than done” (Slife & Zhang, 2014, p. 1945),
making the explorations in this thesis that much more vital.
Exploring the potential of other worldviews in a scientific context does not refute
or downplay naturalism’s illustrious and voluminous contributions to psychological
science either. As has already been well established in the research literature, naturalism
is highly successful within its own sphere of influence upon psychological science. The
problem is not naturalism’s success per se—naturalism’s success is good for
psychological science; rather, the problem is naturalism’s control of what counts as
success.
Thus, an exploration of possible alternative scientific worldviews is concerned
with promoting a plurality of approaches to psychological science, expanding
psychology’s boundaries, and advancing psychological knowledge in all its various forms
(Slife & Gantt, 1999; Slife & Zhang, 2014; Larmer, 2012); indeed, it opens the market
for all qualified competitors to be successful if they excel at contributing to the
psychological encyclopedia. As Slife and Zhang (2014) put it, proponents of a truly
critical approach to psychology “merely [want] to push the pluralism and diversity
envelope a little further” (p. 1946) by establishing a “real methodological pluralism in
psychology” (p. 1945). They contend that methodological pluralism in the traditional
sense is limited to methodological procedures generated from and applied under a
naturalistic worldview—a conception of pluralism controlled by naturalism’s bad
monopoly—and conclude that “To effect a genuinely pluralistic methodology is to
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consider not only a diversity of procedures but also a diversity of the worldviews that
guide the procedures” (p. 1946), i.e., not only “the methodological procedures of each
method but more importantly… the different philosophies that implicitly inform and
guide the methods” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 17).
An openness to alternative worldviews in this pluralistic sense does not mean that
every, or just any, worldview should be considered for psychological science though.
That would be more of an “anything goes” relativism, which is not a proper pluralism
(Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 17). A proper pluralism may also be not the kind framed by the
previously discussed “power” metaphor that emphasizes equality or equal treatment for
all worldviews, since such a conception of pluralism may also border on relativism by
granting an inherent sense of epistemological entitlement to all worldviews without any
grounds for differentiation (Reber & Slife, 2013a). While it is important that alternative
worldviews have an equal opportunity or fair chance to compete, not all worldviews can
or should be treated the same under psychological science. Before a business or
company begins operating, for example, it must first undergo certain checks and
processes, and if it is to qualify as a competitor in the market, it must already be
established in some sense. Similarly, there has to be an adequate rationale for the
consideration of a worldview in the scientific marketplace of psychology because it
would be careless, relativistic, and perhaps even unscientific to simply select just any
random worldview to guide psychological science.
Moreover, such a pluralism is not only concerned with the question of which
alternative worldviews ought to be given a trial in the scientific marketplace of
psychology; it also has implications for the manner by which these worldviews should be
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judged once they have been allowed into that marketplace. What this means is that upon
scientific investigation, “Those worldviews, epistemologies, and methods that do not
advance knowledge of the phenomenon [studied]… would not bear disciplinary fruit, and
would eventually be eliminated” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 17). A pluralism framed by an
understanding of the scientific landscape of psychology as a marketplace is not concerned
with providing equal treatment to alternative worldviews if these worldviews do not yield
credible scientific findings; it emphasizes equal opportunity for the sake of fair
competition instead of striving for equal outcomes. As long as worldviews can compete
fairly, they must rely on their own “intellectual or methodological fertility” (Slife &
Zhang, 2014, p. 1945). That is to say, “The worldviews that guide methodologies must
establish a track record of knowledge advancement in the discipline if they are to remain
in the marketplace of ideas. Their methods must illuminate appropriate meanings of a
phenomenon of importance to psychology in order to remain relevant” (Reber & Slife,
2013a, p. 17). In this sense, equal opportunity does not necessarily lead to equal
outcomes, nor should it.
Worldviews would therefore rise or fall, succeed or fail, or win or lose in the
scientific market of psychology based on their actual ability to contribute to scientific
knowledge of psychological topics, not unlike competing companies in a fair economic
marketplace. Alternative worldviews would not be considered simply because they are
afforded some sort of default epistemological credit by relativism, nor would they
succeed simply by being granted equal status by the “power” metaphor. Worldviews that
are outperformed would no longer have the resources to remain in the market and are
eliminated in this way rather than from preclusion by or the control of a bad monopoly.
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This also means that if naturalism were the best scientific worldview for psychology as
many claim, it would rise above other worldviews by fair competition in the marketplace
and could therefore be considered a good monopoly instead. The upshot is worldviews
other than naturalism can also achieve success this way.
O’Grady (2012) refers to the sort of pluralism that hinges on this fair marketplace
analogy as “an inclusive, ethical, and sophisticated conceptualization of psychological
science and practice” (p. 122)—it is inclusive without assuming relativism, ethical
without guaranteeing equal outcomes, and sophisticated without necessitating a bad
monopoly. She correctly understands what is at stake when she suggests that “the
implications of a truly inclusive conceptualization of science in which theism is accepted
on an assumptive level” (p. 122, emphasis added) be considered. What she means by this
pluralistic conceptualization is the consideration of acceptable, alternative frameworks
through which scientific investigation in psychology can take place, i.e., a pluralism of
worldviews and not simply methods (Slife & Zhang, 2014; Reber & Slife, 2013a). But
what makes the theistic framework or worldview to which she refers a vital candidate for
such consideration that it is explicitly identified over all other possible worldview
alternatives? Evidently, theism’s worldview candidacy for psychological science needs
to be evaluated next.
Theism’s Worldview Candidacy for Psychological Science
The pluralism of scientific worldviews discussed at the end of the previous
section raises the question of which specific worldviews should be considered. Why, in
this case, should psychologists consider theism as a viable candidate for an additional
worldview to guide psychological science, indeed, as the very first candidate? Of the
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many cultural worldviews that are held by different populations throughout the world,
and the worldviews that currently inform the various branches of the academic enterprise,
any number of these could potentially stand in addition to naturalism in guiding scientific
research and practice in psychology upon proper examination and appropriate
application. But Slife et al. (2012) suggest that there are several significant reasons for
theism to be especially recommended as a worldview for researchers engaged in
psychological science, perhaps as the worldview deserving of most urgent consideration:
First, [theism] presents a fairly direct contrast to many secular scientific
assumptions, allowing psychologists to become more aware of their current
method assumptions. Second, the number of people, both scholar and layperson
alike, who subscribe to a theistic worldview is substantial, including the primary
consumers of psychological information (Richards & Bergin, 2005). Third, many
scholars consider theism to be the main rival to a conventional scientific
(naturalistic) worldview in Western culture (e.g., Armstrong, 2011; Griffin, 2000;
Smith, 2001). Fourth, theism may be an important intellectual resource for
psychologists, especially in view of its long tradition of some of the world’s
greatest scholars considering important psychological issues (Nelson &
Thomason, 2012). Fifth, theism will attend to other aspects and explanations of
psychological phenomena that conventional methods may overlook, making it a
potentially valuable supplement or complement, much as the qualitative
worldview presently functions in the discipline. (p. 218)
These seem like important reasons to consider theism in psychology’s scientific context.
In comparison to other worldviews, few are as durable, investigated (in some sense),
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influential, or encompassing as theism. Indeed, despite its stark contrast to naturalism,
theism has obvious relevance, ethical backing, and utility (Vogel et al., 2012).
In fact, it is because of this contrast with naturalism that theism has so much
scientific potential in psychology. Theism is, after all, the most dramatically nonnaturalistic worldview. Most other worldviews are somewhat compatible with
naturalism, and even share some of the same assumptions (Slife, Mitchell & Whoolery,
2004). Naturalism, on the other hand, is the most incompatible with theism (Slife et al.,
2004). Not only does it not share most assumptions with theism, many of these
assumptions are directly opposed. For these reasons, theism is most unlike the received
view in psychological science. Therefore, not only is theism the main rival to naturalism;
it is also the most complete rival.
This complete rivalry is perhaps the most pertinent justification for theism’s
scientific worldview candidacy. For psychological science to be best served naturalism
cannot just be compared with near rivals; it needs a full-blown rival whose
understandings are beyond naturalistic interpretations of natural events and explanations,
one that is seen as almost the opposite of naturalism. This is so because naturalism’s
current bad monopoly cannot be truly challenged until such a drastically non-naturalistic
competitor is pit against it. The consideration of a full-blown rival is perhaps the best
way to establish a fair marketplace because near rivals more easily fall into the control of
a bad monopoly. In other words, rival worldviews that are more similar than dissimilar
to naturalism will, by virtue of the control naturalism has on the judgments made of its
qualities, enjoy more success simply because they share some of the same qualities as
naturalism. The success of a bad monopoly, as illustrated by the historical case of U.S.

26
Steel, seems to benefit its near rivals whose profits also increase as a consequence of
monopolistic price-fixing or perhaps even collusion (Reback, 2007; Parsons & Ray,
1975). A non-naturalistic competitor, on the other hand, would give the bad monopoly a
real run for its money and level the playing field in doing so because it does not benefit at
all from naturalism’s success and is the least susceptible to collusion. Of the available
non-naturalistic alternatives, theism has the most justification as an “important
intellectual resource” with somewhat of an established track record (Slife et al., 2012, p.
218). This makes theism the prime candidate to be considered as another worldview with
which to guide psychological science.
Objections to Theism
Despite these compelling reasons for considering the scientific potential of an
alternative worldview like theism for the discipline of psychology, many have opposed
this proposition (Helminiak, 2010, 2012; Alcock, 2009). They have objected that theism
is not as capable as naturalism because it lacks the characteristics naturalism has to guide
psychological science. Theism does not merit the same consideration as naturalism
because, they claim, theism is too subjective, too personal, too fragmented, not neutral,
irrational, has unproven assumptions, is based on faith rather than evidence, cannot
produce facts, and is unfalsifiable (Helminiak, 2010, 2012). Their objections to theism
on these grounds may even appear self-evident to these critics, and to many psychological
scientists and scholars in general, as if to require no justification or defense (Alcock,
2009). To them, theism obviously lacks the characteristics of a valid scientific worldview
to the extent there exists an automatic presumption that theism is incapable of scientific
application in psychology (Helminiak, 2010, 2012) and is therefore unscientific.
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Moreover, there is frequently an unabashed certainty behind the objections raised against
theism, suggesting forcefully that theism is inferior or problematic on its face compared
to naturalism (Reber & Slife, 2013a).
The reason these characteristics may seem self-evident and are thus taken for
granted has to do with the bad monopoly of naturalism. That is to say, if naturalism
really is the bad monopoly I contend it to be, then these characteristics are defined in
terms of the criteria naturalism controls, which enforces naturalism’s superior scientific
status while lowering that of competing worldviews. Naturalism, unlike the previously
described characteristics of theism, is supposedly objective, public, coherent, neutral,
rational, has proven assumptions, is based on evidence rather than faith, products facts,
and is falsifiable, and it is these characteristics that make naturalism the best scientific
worldview and any other worldview that falls short of these standards inferior to
naturalism and problematic for psychological science. These criteria are considered
necessary for psychological science because the naturalist favors the characteristics
associated with naturalism and controls conceptions of what frameworks or worldviews
are appropriate for psychological science, meaning the list of objections against theism
has to do with the characteristics naturalists feel a scientific worldview should have.
This is not surprising given that bad monopolies control the criteria by which they and
their competitors’ quality are judged. Since theism’s characteristics oppose the criteria
naturalism has set, theism is not fit as a scientific context for investigation in psychology.
Naturalism, on the other hand, is ideally suited to psychological science because it
supposedly satisfies those criteria.
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Since the bad monopoly of naturalism controls these criteria, this makes the
criteria themselves automatically suspicious and questionable. In other words, the
characteristics that are supposedly conducive to psychological science are necessarily
unfair inasmuch as they are the characteristics endorsed by a worldview that has exerted a
bad monopolistic influence on psychological science. How could other worldviews ever
be fairly judged against these criteria? In this sense, the issue is not whether theism can
satisfy naturalism’s criteria because those criteria are not fair. But what if, for the sake of
argument, we granted that the criteria of naturalism are crucial to the scientific
enterprise? After all, these characteristics are nevertheless seen as representative of
psychological science and have become important to what people think psychological
science is. Therefore, we could examine whether theism really is as problematic to
psychological science in terms of its characteristics. Certainly one approach to
dismantling a bad monopoly, in this regard, is to evaluate competitors according to their
own merit and production to see if they really are as inferior as the bad monopoly has
made them out to be. Since bad monopolies are notorious for preventing good
competitors from succeeding as promisingly as their excellence might allow in a fair
marketplace, defending theism, in this sense, would be necessary at some point.
But before this can take place, it is important to determine whether the bad
monopoly is as superior as it claims to be by evaluating whether it actually meets its own
standards or if the criteria it has set are really a façade, akin to raising prices based on
brand recognition without also improving quality or excellence. Brand recognition, in
this case, is the name or reputation of naturalism, so what needs examining is whether
naturalism itself lives up to its own understanding of quality and excellence. The task,
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from this standpoint, is attempting to incriminate naturalism on the premise that
naturalism might not be all that it claims to be. If this were true—if naturalism actually
fails to meet the standards it holds other worldviews to and really has all the same
characteristics as theism—it would mean that the objections to theism should not in
principle rule it out as a potential worldview with which to guide psychological science.
If naturalism is properly understood as a worldview (Slife et al., 2012; Reber &
Slife, 2013a), it may not as easily fit the criteria it is conventionally associated with, and
thus could be “brought down” to theism’s level, so to speak. In other words, naturalists
often refer to naturalism’s aforementioned list of characteristics as support of its scientific
credibility, and they identify objections to theism based on these characteristics, showing
theism to be flawed because it does not meet the criteria like naturalism supposedly does.
But naturalists have not considered that naturalism might be just as flawed as theism
because they have not typically understood naturalism as a worldview (Reber & Slife,
2013a; Slife et al., 2012). The first step to resolving this misunderstanding, then, would
be to see if the worldview of naturalism is as problematic as the worldview of theism
according to the granted characteristics (that are questionable themselves because of the
bad monopoly). If it were, this would then allow for theism to be “brought up” to
naturalism’s level by demonstrating its scientific potential for psychology like naturalism
has been able to do. Since demonstration is a practical matter and we are still only
considering the conceptual foundations of worldviews, i.e., worldview foundations
(Harris, 2004), at this juncture, it is necessary to reach some conclusions about
naturalism’s conceptual influence first before having the justification to explore theism’s
practical potential. The purpose of this section, then, is to explore whether naturalism
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can be incriminated for misrepresenting itself and thus be exposed as “problematic” as
theism for psychological science.
Instead of countering or disproving the objections to theism and defending theism
per se, or even examining whether the claims are as true as critics might believe them to
be, I will explore whether naturalism can also be subjected to all the same criticisms, i.e.,
I will put naturalism on trial by cross-examining it against the objections to theism. If
naturalism is guilty of misrepresenting itself and defaming theism, the case could then be
made that naturalism’s bad monopolistic status blurs or covers its actual characteristics to
make it seem more suitable for psychological science than other worldviews, which
would also mean that the characteristics associated with theism are not valid justifications
for preventing theism from scientific application in psychology and that conventional
wisdom is wrong. In other words, if these objections to theism also apply to naturalism,
then there is no reason theism cannot be considered a viable or appropriate scientific
worldview, not only suggesting that the list of objections is about what worldviews are
appropriate for psychological science according to naturalism’s terms, but more
importantly that naturalism does not even represent itself accurately.
To ensure a pragmatic yet adequate exploration of this issue, this section will
proceed by providing a cursory treatment of each of the aforementioned objections in the
form of a list. Each of these objections or characteristics is profound and much could be
written about any one of them. Because I do not have the space to do each of these
objections complete justice, and since I only intend to compare theism’s objectionable
characteristics to those of naturalism, I will only examine briefly the extent to which each
objection could also be applied to naturalism, while providing some references
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summarizing how other scholars have addressed these objections. All I am trying to do
in reviewing each characteristic is raise doubt about the automatic presumption that these
characteristics are problematic for theism, while attempting to expose the ways in which
naturalism’s bad monopoly might be responsible for this framing of theism as obviously
invalid and self-evidently unacceptable for psychological science.
Theism is too subjective. Many observers will say that theism, unlike
naturalism, cannot be considered scientific because it is too subjective (i.e., “thoroughly
subjective,” “wholly subjective,” “subjectivity par excellence,” etc.; Reber & Slife,
2013a, p. 10); naturalism, on the other hand, maps an “objective” reality, which is the
same for any person regardless of the worldview he or she subscribes to (Slife et al.,
2012). The problem with this reasoning, as I have already discussed, is naturalism is a
worldview rather than a depiction of the objective world or an instrument of objectivity
(Reber & Slife, 2013a; Slife et al., 2012). In other words, naturalism is how naturalists
see the world; it is not itself the natural or objective world devoid of subjectivity. As a
worldview, it is flush with a whole system of values and assumptions (Slife, et al., 2004;
Reber & Slife, 2013a), as well as biases and prejudices (Harris, 2004, Slife & Reber,
2009a), which frame or give certain meanings to the data of psychology. Naturalism, in
this regard, is no more or less subjective (or objective) than theism—it is equally
susceptible to subjectivity as theism (Reber & Slife, 2013a). Naturalism’s valuing of
objectivity, then, is really a subjective construal of objectivity, suggesting that naturalism
values value-freeness, and therefore psychological science ought to proceed in an
objective fashion (Slife et al., 2004). In this sense, naturalism is also value-laden and
shrouded in subjectivity like theism.
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This objection to theism is perhaps the most important because it relates to and
undergirds in some sense all the other objections. The characteristics naturalists feel a
scientific worldview requires all stem from the belief that naturalism is objective and
only that which is objective is scientific. This conventional view of naturalism as a
manifestation of or as synonymous with objectivity considers naturalism as equivalent to
the natural world. In other words, it reifies the worldview of naturalism and the
modernist dualism that accompanies it, and in doing so provides life to each of the
characteristics naturalism is commonly associated with while also painting the objections
to theism from this angle. The upshot is these characteristics of a reified naturalism and
modernist dualism can all be subverted if naturalism is correctly understood as a
worldview, with the same foundations as worldviews that are more easily recognized as
worldviews, such as theism.
Theism is too personal. Theism has also been accused of being too “personal,”
e.g., the “private realm of ‘personal beliefs,’ ‘personal conception,’ ‘personal opinions,’
‘personal faith,’ and ‘personal piety’…” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 9). Naturalism, on the
other hand, “enjoys a large very public role” (p. 9) in the realm of psychological science.
It is worth noting that “personal,” in this sense, has two related dimensions. The first
dimension concerns the private vs. public distinction where knowledge of something is
left to the individual because it differs from person to person (private) or is validated and
thus shared by a community (public). This distinction is often accompanied with the
provision that true knowledge cannot be considered as such until it is publicly accepted.
The second dimension concerns the related disagreement vs. agreement distinction. If a
matter is personal, it will be expected that people will disagree with one another. On the
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other hand, when people come to agreement, the matter of concern is no longer simply
personal. Disagreement is more likely within the private realm while agreement is
expected in the public realm. The former is a manifestation of subjectivity while the
latter eschews subjectivity for objectivity.
While naturalism tends to be viewed as public and therefore as something people
will agree upon, it is more similar in kind to theism than is typically thought in that
naturalism is also a belief system that not everyone agrees with. Because theism is often
viewed as a personal concern, “not every [therapy] client will agree with the assumptions
and biases of a theistic approach…” (Slife et al., 2012, p. 232). But “this point applies
with equal force to naturalistic approaches. Naturalism is… a worldview… about which
many clients, both theistic and non-theistic, might not agree” (p. 232). Moreover,
Johnson and Watson (2012) note that “not all thoughtful humans believe that that
worldview [naturalism] is even valid” and some “have argued that naturalism is
inherently self-contradictory” (p. 271). Such disagreement denotes that naturalism may
be more private than conventional wisdom suggests. By referring to itself as public and
theism as personal, naturalism puts itself in an easy position to quash any challenge to its
scientific mantle.
Theism is too fragmented. Because theism has many varieties, some will say
that it is too fragmented and not unified or coherent enough to guide psychological
science (Helminiak, 2010, 2012). With such divergent categorical varieties as idealistic
monism, panentheism, monotheism, Trinitarian theism, deism, polytheism, animism, etc.
(Johnson & Watson, 2012), not to mention subcategorical varieties such as Islam,
Judaism, and Christianity of the Abrahamic religions, theism could lead not only to
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further fragmentation in psychology, but potentially to a complete relativism as well
(Helminiak, 2012). This issue also stems from the disagreement (fragmentation) vs.
agreement distinction discussed under the previous objection.
While naturalism is not typically thought to be fragmented like theism, Johnson
and Watson (2012) clarify that “naturalism is not as unifying as might be believed. This
is partly because there are significantly different kinds of naturalism: ontological or
strong, supervenient or non-reductive, and methodological, as well as humanist and
postmodernist versions…” (p. 272), not to mention “Marxist, and classical Buddhist” (p.
274). In this sense, naturalism is just as susceptible to fragmentation as theism, but that
has not prevented a unified or coherent conception of naturalism from emerging as a
scientific worldview. Moreover, a similarly coherent notion of theism may also be
available (e.g., Slife & Zhang, 2014; Melling, 2013), and some scholars actually welcome
fragmentation in the form of rich diversity and consider it an academic advantage (e.g.,
Johnson & Watson, 2012).
Theism is not neutral. Theism is typically considered extremely biased and
prejudiced, perhaps more so than any other belief system (Slife & Zhang, 2014). The
implication of this bias is that theism is not neutral toward other beliefs and therefore
cannot guide scientific investigation in psychology. Naturalism, on the other hand, is
often thought of as neutral toward other worldviews because of its supposed objectivity.
In other words, it is considered “neutral to or compatible with” worldviews other than
those that the methods assume” (Slife et al., 2012, p. 214) and therefore psychologists
“only present the objective evidence gained from their scientific psychological research;
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evidence that is supposedly neutral with regard to theism or any other worldview” (Reber
& Slife, 2013b, p. 63).
However, this naturalistic tendency toward neutrality has been identified as “the
myth of neutrality” (Slife et al., 2012; Reber & Slife, 2013b) because naturalism is really
not as neutral toward other worldviews as it may purport to be. When naturalists claim to
have discovered an objective law of nature in science or psychology, the law is
supposedly “true for adherents of other worldviews as well” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 9)
and “Because the objectively discovered laws are true for all people, including theists,
then theists must accommodate the physical and psychological laws into their
worldview” (p. 9). This is not a consequence of neutrality however, since natural laws
are considered as such as a result of a naturalistic (rather than objective) interpretation of
law-resembling regularities, suggesting that all worldviews including naturalism are
equally susceptible to bias toward their own interpretive systems and against those of
other worldviews. Claims of objectivity and thus neutrality are therefore not only
superficial but also manipulative, in some sense.
Theism is irrational. Some will equate naturalism with reason, arguing that
rationalism is one of the pillars of psychological science, and relegate worldviews such as
theism to the realm of irrationality (Harris, 2004; Johnson, 1998; Slife & Richards, 2001).
This is, however, a mistaken idea about the relationship between worldviews and reason.
Worldview preferences, in fact, “precede the rational support of those preferences,” so
that all worldviews, including naturalism, are “pre-rational rather than the required
outcome of inescapable logic” (Harris, 2004, p. 91). In other words, naturalism’s
“preferences” or assumptions are not themselves arrived at logically. Its assumptions,
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like those of any worldview, must already be in place to logically reason from (Slife &
Richards, 2001), implying that all worldviews necessarily have some “rationality” and
“irrationality” to them. Rationality is contingent on a worldview’s foundations and its
resulting system of interpretation, and thus is not pure, uninterpreted, or universal logic;
therefore, naturalism is not the only worldview that can claim to be rational (or
scientific). To believe otherwise is to attempt to establish the credibility of naturalism
using logic derived from the same worldview—the bad monopoly situation again.
Equating naturalism with reason ensures that naturalism always “wins” the rigged game.
Since such circularity of logic is an apparent logical problem in itself, it is evidently
another of naturalism’s dirty tactics to maintain its monopolistic status.
Theism’s assumptions are unproven. Others will challenge theism on the basis
of its “unproven” assumptions. They frequently argue that the existence and activity of
God is purely a theological question that cannot be definitively answered or proved one
way or another, and therefore has no place in psychology (Helminiak, 2010, 2012),
whereas natural laws are apparent for all to experience and comprehend and have been
proven to operate in a knowable and predictable way. The problem with this argument is
every worldview has a core foundation that consists of basic ideas or assumptions that
cannot be proven yet must be granted for coherency (Harris, 2004; Reber & Slife,
2013a). In the case of naturalism and theism, “neither the assumption of material
exclusivity [natural laws1] nor the assumption of God’s presence [and activity] can be
proven empirically. They are not subject to proof but are assumed as part of one’s
1

The irony is that natural laws are not themselves material; otherwise they would corrode
and change, as all material entities do. They are, instead, metaphysical “realities” that
govern the material.
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ontological set” (Harris, 2004, p. 80). In other words, the basic assumptions of
naturalism are unproven—and unable to be proved—like those of theism (Slife et al.,
2012; Reber & Slife, 2013a).
Reber and Slife (2013a) reinforce this point by noting that naturalism, like theism,
is grounded in “untested assumptions” and that these assumptions
cannot be observationally studied… The worldviews of naturalism and theism, in
this sense, are not observable, nor are the assumptions that inform each
worldview. Indeed, the scientific doctrine of observability—that only the
observable is knowable—is itself unobservable. In this sense, any presumption
(e.g., Alcock, 2009) that the first premises that inform naturalism have somehow
passed an empirical test that the first premises of theism have failed is, in
principle, deeply problematic… They each accept the first premise of their
respective worldviews as true without… empirical validation… first premises are
‘leaps of faith.’ (p. 13).
In this sense, natural laws are not observable or empirical, no different than theistic
activity. Rather, both natural laws and God are unobservable, unseen entities inferred
from their postulated observable manifestations or empirical evidence (Slife et al., 2012;
Slife & Zhang, 2014).
Theism is based on faith rather than evidence. Many observers will color
theism as the antithesis of psychological science because theism is based on faith whereas
psychological science is based on evidence. While this is somewhat accurate in the sense
that theists have faith in a God that is unseen, it is worth nothing, as it pertains to
psychological science, that naturalists also have faith in their unseen natural laws. This is
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the reason Johnson (1990a) states that “faith in naturalism is no more ‘scientific’ (i.e.,
empirically based) than any other kind of faith” (p. 17; see also Johnson, 2010). In other
words, natural laws as the first premises of naturalism are “leaps of faith,” just like God is
a leap of faith for theism. This means, according to Reber and Slife (2013a), that “it
would be inappropriate to differentiate naturalism from theism by claiming that
naturalism is devoid of unproven, taken-on-faith, assumptions, values, and
interpretations, or that it is free of the influence of such things” (emphasis added, p. 13).
Because fundamental assumptions and suppositions cannot be proven, they must be taken
on faith, meaning naturalism’s assumption of natural laws also requires faith on behalf of
the beholder, similar in kind to faith in a divine being.
This point is associated with a related issue concerning what counts as evidence.
As discussed under the previous objection, empirical evidence derived under naturalism
is not proof of naturalism per se. Rather, empirical evidence is used to make inferences
about the non-empirical entities that make up a worldview. Evidence, in this sense, can
only be gathered and interpreted within a pre-established view of reality. As Larmer
(2012) puts it, “Evidence is always assessed within the context of numerous background
beliefs… we seek to interpret and fit evidence into a prior framework of belief” (p. 147).
This is why naturalists and theists often both point to the same events as evidence of their
assumptions: natural laws or God (Forland, 2008). That the same event can be evidence
of two opposing worldviews suggests the significance of the interpretive element of
evidence, also meaning there is evidence for theism in the same way there is evidence for
naturalism.

39
Furthermore, the conventional naturalistic spin on evidence often restricts what
counts as evidence to that which is empirical in the sense that the natural world is thought
to be comprehensible by sensory experience. Naturalism controls the notion of evidence,
in this regard, by granting greater credibility to forms of evidence that are more
consistent with its own assumptions and points of focus, so that “evidence” is not as
broadly construed as it could be but rather is compounded with or reduced to empirical
evidence of the sensory sort (Slife & Slife, 2014; Slife & Melling, 2008). In this manner,
naturalism often precludes forms of evidence that are considered more consistent with
theism, such as evidence based on epistemologies other than the narrow empiricism
naturalism is frequently associated with (Slife & Slife, 2014; Slife & Melling, 2008),
suggesting that the evidence for theism is not necessarily the evidence controlled by
naturalism.
Theism cannot produce facts. This particular objection can be framed by what
is known as the belief vs. fact or belief vs. knowledge distinction. According to Slife,
Starks, and Primosch (2014), “beliefs are frequently considered more subjective, more
arbitrary, and more disputable, whereas facts are more objective, less arbitrary, and less
disputable” (p. 346). This means that theism cannot produce facts because it is simply
too subjective of a belief, which makes it the antithesis of plain factual knowledge.
Naturalism, meanwhile, is supposedly capable of producing “objective and assumptionfree facts” (p. 346). This objection to theism prioritizes facts over beliefs so that theism
is inferior to naturalism because mere belief without justification cannot be considered
knowledge. Nelson (1990) is skeptical about this distinction because, as he says, “all
facts… are capable of alternative interpretation” (p. 25), suggesting that all “facts” are

40
interpretations. This is consistent with Popper’s (2002) analysis that naturalism’s
“upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have
only proposed a convention” (p. 52). Facts, in this regard, are a “pretense of factuality or
truth” (Slife & Reber, 2013a, p. 14).
The belief vs. fact distinction, then, is actually superficial because “facts” are
“labels” (Johnson, 1990a, 2010). The real issue is not, for example, the “fact” of the
existence of regularity in the natural world; it is the interpretation of that regularity as
such and the meaning given to it. In other words, all “facts” are based on beliefs or
interpretations derived from a worldview or “features of an assumption-laden
interpretative framework” (Slife et al., 2014, p. 346), that make sense of the grounding of
a phenomenon, e.g., the naturalistic interpretation of the existence of regularities as
evidence of natural laws. This explains the “tendency to reify naturalism [or naturalistic
beliefs] through the belief vs. fact distinction” (p. 346), since naturalists have typically
reified their interpretation made of the grounding of “facts” to the extent that there exists
a lack of awareness surrounding where their interpretation originated from and alternative
interpretations become negligible. Once the belief vs. fact distinction is broken down,
however, it becomes apparent that naturalism’s ability to produce facts and to decry
theism as incapable of doing so is really an act of labeling, not knowledge advancement,
thus further incriminating naturalism.
Theism is unfalsifiable. Theism has also been traditionally considered an
unfalsifiable philosophy incapable of producing falsifiable hypotheses, much like
psychoanalysis, for example (Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Helminiak, 2010, 2012). Its
concerns, critics say, are “metaphysical” or “speculative” (Lilienfeld et al., 2013), and
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thus not scientific because the metaphysical and speculative are not viewed as falsifiable.
In a way this is true since, as we have already discussed, the assumptions of any
worldview cannot be proven, or, conversely, falsified, which means that naturalism is not
immune from this criticism either. As a worldview, naturalism is just as unfalsifiable as
the worldview of theism because no worldview can be falsified under its own conditions.
For example, while naturalistic methods are capable of falsifying hypotheses generated
by the naturalistic worldview, these methods are not capable of falsifying the
assumptions of the naturalistic worldview that undergirds them (Slife et al., 2012; Dilley,
2010). In other words, “to adopt methodological naturalism is to guarantee that all
phenomena will be viewed as having a naturalistic explanation…” (Larmer, 2012, p.
139).
Consider, in this regard, how methodological naturalism’s ability to generate
falsifiable hypotheses is related to an unfalsifiable metaphysic of its own:
under [methodological naturalism] scientific counter evidence against
[metaphysical naturalism] is barred. Since [methodological naturalism] requires
that all scientific evidence be given a natural explanation, evidence can never
disconfirm [metaphysical naturalism], no matter what the evidence on hand
actually is. This is not to say that scientific evidence fails to disconfirm
[metaphysical naturalism] as a matter of fact, but that it cannot as a matter of
principle... (Dilley, 2010, p. 129).
In other words, you cannot falsify naturalism with its own method. Thus, naturalism is
unfalsifiable in this sense, not unlike theism. Because both worldviews are unfalsifiable,
the worldview of naturalism is also “metaphysical” and “speculative” like theism. This
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also means that it may be possible for the unfalsifiable theistic worldview to generate
theistic hypotheses that are falsifiable (and therefore scientific) like traditional naturalistic
hypotheses generated by naturalism (Reber et al., 2012; Dilley, 2010). After all,
naturalism has clearly demonstrated that unfalsifiable worldviews can still give rise to
constructs with which to operate and investigate.
Conclusion. Thus, we see that the criticisms of theism are applicable to
naturalism as well, and therefore the objections toward considering theism’s scientific
potential must really be based on the control enacted by the bad monopoly of naturalism
to sway scientific judgments in psychology. In this sense, naturalism can be incriminated
for misrepresenting itself as somehow inherently superior or non-problematic for
psychological science compared to theism when, according to the analysis in this section,
it really has all the same characteristics or qualities as theism. These qualities are what
naturalists claim make other worldviews incapable of guiding psychological science (or
unscientific). But none of these reasons have prevented naturalism from doing so.
Therefore, there is no good reason theism should be disallowed to guide psychological
science, given this perspective, unless it is subjected to a different standard altogether
(Reber & Slife, 2013a, 2013b).
Perhaps the more important conclusion is that naturalism has been a fruitful
scientific worldview despite actually sharing the same qualities as theism. Given the
scientific fruitfulness of naturalism despite its putatively nonscientific properties, and its
similarities in this regard to theism, theism’s worldview candidacy for psychological
science cannot be as easily disputed as typically thought. The reasons supporting
theism’s candidacy outweigh all of these “objections” because naturalists are guilty of a
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kind of defamation of character against theism by drawing on various questionable
dualisms to paint theism’s inferiority while unfairly and deceptively extolling their own
worldview.
To Be Truly Scientific, or Not To Be
Given that naturalism is a worldview like theism, it is also subjective, personal,
fragmented, irrational, and unfalsifiable like theism. Like theism, naturalism is also not
neutral toward other worldviews, has just as many unproven assumptions, is based on
faith, and cannot produce facts. In other words, naturalism is another set of biases rather
than the objective, public, rational, proven, neutral, factual entity it claims to be. That
being the case, by masquerading as said entity, as if it is not actually a worldview,
naturalism has skewed psychological science toward its own biased direction and has not
examined its own basis critically. The most serious implication that follows is naturalism
has maintained its monopolistic status by preventing other worldviews from competing
fairly in the scientific marketplace of psychology, often ruling them out before they even
have the opportunity to be investigated.
But since, as a worldview and system of biases, naturalism is really no different in
kind to theism, it needs to re-examine itself, particularly its bad monopolistic influence
on psychological science. Because of this influence, naturalism has controlled the criteria
of psychological science and shaped psychological science in its own image, and theism
has been assumed to be the opposite of or anathema to psychological science—
supernaturalism versus naturalism—where theism is concerned with the supernatural and
the supernatural is not scientific. The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate this
presumed problem to see if this perceived opposition is really true: Can theism actually
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follow through (like naturalism) and establish testable constructs and hypotheses,
produce new and significant findings, and deliver a program of research for psychology?
Before theism is explored further in this sense, it may help to briefly consider
what true science really is. So far, I have only alluded to this in discussing the
implications of naturalism’s bad monopoly on psychological science, and it might have
been assumed all along that this sort of monopoly is not scientific, but I have not
explicitly identified why this is so and what it means to be truly scientific. Therefore, I
will clarify naturalism’s relationship to science here to tie it all neatly together before
proceeding to the next chapter.
Because the worldview of naturalism is at best “an arbitrary commitment, a
philosophy standing before and outside of science, and not an essential aspect of science
or the scientific method” (Harris, 2004, p. 112), it is wrong to consider naturalism as
synonymous with psychological science. “After all,” as Rea (2002) questions, “if
everything else is at the mercy of science, why not naturalism?” (p. 52). Rather than
being scientific, naturalism is actually “extra-scientific” (Vogel et al., 2012; Midgley,
2011). The danger to psychological science is not the consideration of alternative
worldviews like theism, as naturalists tend to think (Reber & Slife, 2013a), because all
worldviews are equally extra-scientific. No, “The real danger to psychological science,”
as Johnson (1990b) observes, “is that it is being linked to a dogma [naturalism] that can’t
stand close examination in order to further an ideological agenda that goes way beyond
the proper concerns of science” (p. 52).
This bold declaration suggests at its heart that psychological science in its fullest
and truest sense is “the systematic investigation of ideas” (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 17)
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and that such investigation cannot be limited to any one worldview. Otherwise, it risks
control by a bad monopoly such as naturalism. Slife et al. (2012) drive home this point
when they conclude that since “The hallmark of science is the investigation of ideas… To
identify science with a particular epistemology and/or method [worldview] is to decide
before investigation what philosophies work best. This position seems singularly
unscientific to us” (p. 221; emphasis added). This suggests, contrary to conventional
wisdom, that naturalism’s monopoly is detrimental to psychological science and needs
upending. For these reasons, unrestrained scientific inquiry in psychology is not only
open to alternative guiding worldviews but demands they are considered. Thus,
establishing a fair marketplace for these worldviews is the only way to be truly scientific.
Conclusion
This chapter has raised several important questions about the nature of
psychological science. Foremost among these is the question of whether psychological
science needs to consider alternative worldviews than naturalism and whether theism
should be an important alternative worldview for guiding scientific investigation in
psychology in addition to naturalism. I have answered both questions in the affirmative
because naturalism—the current guiding philosophy of science in psychology—has a bad
monopoly on psychological science, inasmuch as it prevents other worldviews from
competing fairly in psychology’s scientific marketplace by controlling the criteria of
psychological science and giving itself its own stamp of approval. This sort of
exclusiveness is not only detrimental to psychological science; it is wholly unscientific.
It means that naturalism itself has not been investigated with the same rigorous standard
it demands for scientific investigation. For naturalism to be subject to a truly scientific
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standard requires recognizing naturalism for what it is: a worldview. It also means that
alternative worldviews be allowed to compete fairly in the scientific marketplace of
psychology. There is perhaps no better worldview to consider, in this regard, than theism
because it has the strongest candidacy as naturalism’s most complete rival.
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Chapter 2: Can Theism Add Something New or Different to Psychology?
Now that it is clear that naturalism is itself a worldview that affects the framing
and interpretation of psychological findings and that theism is an important alternative
worldview to consider for psychological science—indeed, as the most complete rival
worldview to naturalism—it is crucial to query what theism might add to psychology, or
whether it is capable of adding anything new or different at all. After all, if theism really
is the most complete rival to naturalism, why are the theists of psychology not raising the
alarm about naturalism? Why are they seemingly content to continue their naturalistic
work? The answer to these questions is a kind of compartmentalization of these
worldviews, where each is relegated to separate portions of the world. In other words,
theism might make sense as this quintessential rival to naturalism inasmuch as it deals
with the supernatural world, but there would be no point to entertain the possibility of
theism in psychology because naturalism already takes care of the natural or
psychological world. This compartmentalization (or relegation) of theism and naturalism
to different parts of the world (the supernatural against the natural) gives rise to the
presumption, held even by many theists, that theism is not capable of producing new
psychological findings.
Because each worldview concerns a different part of the world, from this
perspective, theism, for many theists, is seen to complement rather than really rival
naturalism since their concerns do not overlap.2 In other words, many theists, especially
in psychology, understand theism to mean “naturalism plus God,” whereby they
2

The principle of non-overlapping magisteria could be applied to capture the
complementarity of these two worldviews according to the way in which many theists
view the compartmentalized relationship.
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understand their world with a naturalistic philosophy for all natural events and processes
and with a theistic philosophy for all supernatural events and processes (Slife & Reber,
2009a). This is the principle reason theists typically have no worries working with
naturalism as psychologists (Reber & Slife, 2013a). Theism, in this sense, is really not a
wholly other or different worldview or philosophy when natural events and processes are
concerned because it is thought to be irrelevant rather than to make any difference
regarding the natural world. Not only does this suggest that even many theists find
naturalism to comprehensively and sufficiently cover the natural world of psychological
events; it also implies that when theists may want to add God onto the naturalism picture
in psychology, this addition would alter none of the picture’s fundamental features (Slife
& Reber, 2009a).
This chapter calls this compartmentalized view of theism into question, and
considers whether theism really is a different philosophy with different explanations and
predictions for psychological (and thus natural) events. In other words, the main focus of
this chapter is whether theism has different conceptual and practical implications for
natural (and thus psychological) events. Put another way, although theism seems to be
mainly concerned with supernatural events, does it also have something to say about the
natural events of psychology? We know that naturalism denies the supernatural (Slife &
Reber, 2009a) but what does theism really make of the natural? Theism has to be able to
produce alternative or new psychological findings to those already being produced under
the worldview of naturalism to be considered a viable additional worldview candidate for
psychological science. If it simply repeats the findings of naturalism, as the
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compartmentalized view suggests, it would be a superfluous consideration and an
unnecessary addition to the plurality of approaches to psychological science.
Hence, I compare naturalism with theism in this chapter to see if they are different
enough for theism to offer a unique and difference-making understanding of the
psychological world. First, I examine the theoretical premises of naturalism and theism
as well as their most fundamental differences to understand how a noncompartmentalized theism would approach the natural. Second, I consider some other
conceptual differences between these two worldviews that may be less apparent but not
less important. All of these conceptual differences have practical implications for how
psychological events and subjects are understood, so a final comparison will be made to
determine whether or to what extent theism might differ with naturalism in terms of
practical psychological phenomena. I conclude by briefly considering what implications
these conceptual and practical differences might have for psychological research in its
current disciplinary constitution.
Fundamental Differences
At first blush, as suggested by their rivalry, theism might appear to be quite
different from naturalism. After all, clearly these two worldviews differ on whether they
affirm divine action. Naturalism’s very tenets reject the transcendent (Taylor, 2007)
because it considers natural laws to be sufficient explanations of all the world’s events
(Slife & Whoolery, 2006). Thoroughgoing naturalism understands the world as godless,
i.e., God is not considered real or effectual, to the extent that any supposed manifestations
or experiences of God can be explained as fundamentally natural events or functions.
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Still, there are varieties of naturalism that are seemingly compatible with theism,
such as deism and dualism (Slife & Reber, 2009a; Melling, 2009). Deism and dualism
compartmentalize natural processes and divine action so that only one or the other is
relevant at a particular time—deism’s notion of God’s involvement in creating the world
but the subsequent governance of natural laws in sustaining it—or in a particular place or
event—dualism’s separation of the supernatural sphere from the natural sphere (Slife &
Reber, 2009a). Since both of these conceptions are not closed off to the divine per se,
they are, in fact, traditionally considered varieties of theism (Melling, 2009). However,
because God is not thought to matter in the current, natural, psychological world
according to either deism or dualism, these conceptions foreground, in effect, the present
natural world and its lawfulness, and thus are actually and ultimately naturalistic.
By contrast, theism, in its most encompassing and legitimate sense, is different
from naturalism and these “theistic” subsets of naturalism because God’s current,
practical activity must be conceived of and accounted for according to a thoroughly
theistic view of reality. In this sense, theism assumes that “God is already and always
intimately acting in nature which depends moment to moment… upon divine activity”
(Plantinga, 2001, p. 350), while naturalism, even with its “theistic” allowances (such as
deism or dualism), “makes the preinvestigatory assumption that the supernatural [i.e.,
God] is not needed for conceptualizing, conducting, or explaining scholarship and
investigation in psychological science” (Slife & Reber, 2009a, pp. 64-65). According to
Slife and Zhang (2014), naturalism’s “contrast with theism stems from its specific focus
on natural events and topics as if they can be distinguished from supernatural events and
topics. A theist does not make this distinction and thus does not engage in this sort of
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dualism; God is just as involved in the ‘natural’ as the ‘supernatural’” (p. 1942).
Naturalists, meanwhile, posit a dualism of natural and supernatural entities and discredit,
explicitly or implicitly, the supernatural realm, relegating it to a level of explanation that
makes no meaningful difference to the self-contained and self–operating natural world.
Thus, these two worldviews clearly differ on the assumption of God’s current,
practical activity in the natural realm. Theism (properly understood), in this sense, is not
only postulating a supernatural realm, it also offers a different conception of the natural
realm. A theistic interpretation of reality implies divine concurrence with all of nature
(Bishop, 2009), with divine involvement, influences, and actions constituting a necessary
condition (among other necessary conditions) in understanding and explaining—and thus
investigating—any “natural” psychological phenomenon (Slife & Reber, 2009a). The
problem is that this fundamental difference has been underestimated because the attempt
to make theistic aspects compatible with naturalism has altered what theism in its most
thoroughgoing sense actually is (Melling, 2013). Theism, in actuality, makes a big
difference in understanding the world (Slife et al., 2012) since its conception of the
natural realm necessarily includes divine activity; the supernatural is not merely added
onto the natural, even if it is given equal status or greater weight compared to the natural.
In this way, theism is not only wholly different than naturalism; it is also considerably
different from many people’s conceptions of theism, including the compartmentalized
view held by many theists in psychology who consider theism to be complementary to
naturalism. Therefore, the difference theism makes in understanding the natural is the
principal point of consideration of this thesis.
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Other Conceptual Differences
Although the assumption of God’s current activity in the natural realm is perhaps
the most notable conceptual difference between naturalism and theism, it is not the only
assumption on which these two worldviews differ, by which theism could be granted
license to make a practical difference. Consider, also, how naturalism and theism offer
different understandings of the concept of natural “order.” Although the naturalist and
the theist are equally interested in the patterns and regularities of the world, their
interpretations of these natural patterns and regularities are starkly opposed (Slife &
Reber, 2009a; Slife & Zhang, 2014). According to Taylor (2007), “Modern [naturalistic]
science offers us a view of the universe framed in general laws. The ultimate is an
impersonal order of regularities in which all particular things exist...” (p. 362).
Consistent with this interpretation, the naturalist sees natural order as “impersonal,
lawful, and determined” (Slife & Reber, 2009a, p. 70). The theist, on the other hand,
understands order as it “relates [humans] to a personal Creator-God” (Taylor, 2007, p.
362); in other words, the theist conceives of natural order as a “personal, divine, and
obedient order. The common term ‘order’ denotes the importance of regularities for both
perspectives, but the nature, source, and meaning of this term could not be more
different” (emphasis added; Slife & Reber, 2009a, p. 70).
Furthermore, although both naturalism and theism understand the order of the
natural world as consisting of regularities (despite understanding these regularities
differently), only theism considers the possibility of and has interest in irregularities
(Slife et al., 2012; Melling, 2009). “Irregularities” refer to singular, one-time, or
particular events or experiences, which could be as momentous as the one-time
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resurrection of Jesus Christ for the Christian theist or as relatively inconsequential as the
particular love of a particular mother for a particular child. Naturalism, by contrast,
emphasizes only lawful regularities, thus not attending to irregularities or understanding
them as either unknown regularities or more complex regularities, but regularities
nonetheless. The naturalistic worldview would either explain away such particularities
because they are supposedly the convergence of more general laws, or not study them at
all because they are not replicable.
From the theist’s perspective, however, it is perfectly reasonable to study singular
events (Forland, 2008; Nichols, 2002; Larmer, 2011, 2012), even though they are not
usually replicable in the traditional naturalistic sense. By contrast, the theistic worldview
approaches particularities by exposing all their uniqueness, particularly the divine aspect
of God’s particular, context-specific ministering and activity (Reber & Slife, 2013b).
This also means that what may appear to be natural regularities or patterns might be more
singular in divine nature. Thus, theism values the irregular while naturalism discounts it,
which is another significant conceptual difference between the two worldviews.
Practical Implications for Psychology
The differences between naturalism and theism are not limited to merely abstract
or conceptual differences either. Practical implications for subjects directly related to
psychology are also apparent from their differences. In other words, theism’s conceptual
differences to naturalism mean that a theistic approach to psychological phenomena will
differ significantly from a naturalistic approach. There will be practical implications for
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the research and practices of psychology3 (Slife et al., 2012, Slife & Zhang, 2014,
Melling, 2013). In this section, however, I will not directly consider any implications for
psychological research, though such implications could be inferred. Because the prospect
of theistic research is the overarching purpose, I will devote the following two chapters to
establishing an expansive foundation and executing the ensuing formula.
This section, on the other hand, will explore some implications of theism’s
differences from naturalism pertaining to some prominent examples of psychological
subjects that are tied to practices. In other words, the purpose of this specific section is to
explore practical rather than research implications. While a large variety of examples
could be utilized to delineate the effects of these implications, including approaching this
task with a flurry of such examples, I will consider just two illustrative examples for the
sake of depth rather than breadth. Both examples have clear implications for mental
illness and psychotherapy, which constitute some of the most practical and pressing
concerns of psychology. The first example considers how theism might suggest a
different understanding or approach to evaluating certain diagnostic criteria for
schizophrenia. The second example relates depression to the medical model and shows
how a theistic approach to treatment might differ from a traditional naturalistic approach.
Example 1: Schizophrenia. Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (1973) once critiqued the
commonly accepted psychopathologic conclusion that “If you talk to God, you are
praying; If God talks to you, you have schizophrenia” (p. 113).” Although Szasz’s
critique occurs in a different context than the current exploration, some of his ideas are
3

Although research and practice are typically not as easily separable despite being
clearly distinguishable from each other, I regard them separately based on their defining
functions while recognizing that their purposes are tied together.
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also applicable here in distinguishing between naturalism and theism. It is well
documented that many hallucinations and delusions of paranoid schizophrenia involve
religious content (Krzystanek et al., 2012; Bhavsar & Bhugra, 2008; Doerr & Velasquez,
2007) and that many schizophrenic patients experience religious delusions (Krzystanek et
al., 2012; Siddle et al., 2002; Rudaleviciene et al., 2008). It has also been postulated that
those who suffer from such delusions are more seriously ill (Siddle et al., 2002). Many
reported religious delusions involve visions of, interaction with, or identification as God
or other divine entities (Krzystanek et al., 2012). Naturalists would likely surmise that
God speaking to or visiting a person qualifies in many cases as a symptom of
schizophrenia because God cannot be real in any meaningful sense in a naturalistic world.
This is partly the reason these divine manifestations are considered hallucinations or
delusions; they are thought to arise from pathologic mental (and thus natural) processes
as framed by naturalism, rather than reflect the possibilities of a different worldview.
Theists, on the other hand, would be open to the possibility of God speaking to or
visiting a person in a way not automatically considered to be delusional, even for
schizophrenic patients, because their worldview does not obviate it from the outset. A
theistic worldview would consider that God is capable of acting in natural, mental
processes, and this way theists might not necessarily consider communication from God
as a symptom of mental illness, though they would, of course, also consider the
possibility of such religious content being delusional. The difference is theism is not
closed off to any of these possibilities before they are investigated, while naturalism
deems investigation to be unnecessary because it presupposes the impossibility of divine
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occurrences being real and therefore also does not consider that such experiences might
be real or meaningful to schizophrenic patients.
A theistic approach to psychotherapy, then, might entail exploring purported
divine communication in different and more meaningful ways than conventional
naturalistic approaches. For example, supposedly pathologic divine experiences could be
interpreted against a backdrop of religious narratives and the specific beliefs of the
patient, instead of automatically attributing such experiences to psychopathology. This
would necessitate that psychotherapists be at least somewhat educated in different
religious traditions and theology to be able to explore all possible diagnoses and
interpretations. Furthermore, theistic psychotherapists could also operate with the
assumption that just because they may not be able to witness what their clients claim to
be experiencing does not necessarily mean that those experiences are invalid. That some
divine experiences are automatically discounted or discredited before they are thoroughly
investigated, if at all (Slife et al., 2014), demonstrates the covert operation of an
unscientific, naturalistic worldview that makes a priori judgments about divine
involvement; a theistic worldview, by contrast, is open to exploring God’s involvement in
less presumptuous ways, taking theistic claims at face value and practicing sensitivity
toward patients’ interpreted realities, but also thoroughly investigating such claims and
determining whether they are delusional or not. In this regard, learning about cultural
and religious traditions would be needed to help distinguish between delusional and
acceptable (normal) religious experiences (Slife & Reber, 2012).
Although this brief discussion undoubtedly simplifies the criteria and
complexities of schizophrenia, taking only one particular symptom out of the larger
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context of psychosis as an illustration, it clearly exemplifies how naturalism and theism
could have quite different understandings of the same psychological event, with differing
practical and psychotherapeutic ramifications. Unlike naturalism, theism would not
automatically necessitate (i.e., a priori) that patients’ mental or supposed physical
experiences of God indicate they are out of touch with reality, as if to say one cannot
experience divine beings or manifestations because such things do not exist except in a
person’s (natural) imagination. Indeed, theists might understand the mental world
differently, perhaps as harmonious with the transcendent or in terms of divine immanence
within a particular religious tradition (Melling, 2013).4
Example 2: Depression. As another telling example of practical psychological
import, consider how depression could be understood quite differently from the
perspectives of naturalism and theism. Many naturalists consider depression to be an
illness to be treated, an obstacle to be removed, or a problem to be solved because it is a
form of suffering and suffering is generally considered unpleasant, undesirable, and
unnecessary (Hall, Langer & McMartin, 2010); therefore, it would make sense to treat or
eliminate depression, from this perspective, so that a patient’s mental condition and
general wellbeing improves, moving him or her toward happiness and away from misery.
This is because one of naturalism’s direct implications is hedonism, the assumption that it
is natural and normal to seek pleasure and avoid pain (Slife et al., 2004). Human nature,
4

The standard conception of immanence implies a complete opposition to divinity or
transcendence (Vandenberg & O’Connor, 2005). Larson (2014), however, distinguishes
between transcendence and immanence while basing both concepts on the experience of
the divine. With transcendence, experience of the divine is beyond human limits (e.g.,
supernatural), while immanence involves more concrete divine manifestations such as the
mental (i.e., natural) kind.
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according to naturalism, along with the natural laws governing it, is considered
hedonistic, and therefore so are the most ideal therapy outcomes (Slife, 2004a; Richards
& Bergin, 2005; Slife & Whoolery, 2006). In other words, “Some version of happiness
or self-benefit is a standard therapeutic goal. Chronic suffering or depression is typically
viewed as inherently bad. Part of the obligation of any health professional, in light of the
medical (naturalistic) model, is to prevent pain and relieve suffering” (Slife, 2004a).
Depression, therefore, as perhaps the most common example of psychological pain and
suffering, should be approached as any medical illness, i.e., it should be eliminated by
any means necessary because it is mutually incompatible with good mental health. This
also means, however, that hedonism “puts severe constraints on the meaning and purpose
of suffering… Depression, for instance, can have no legitimate purpose or function in
itself. It is only legitimate if it serves as a means to some greater happiness (e.g., stress
inoculation)” (Slife, 2004a).
On the other hand, this supposedly “common-sense” psychological (naturalistic)
understanding of therapy outcome (Hall, Langer & McMartin, 2010) might not
necessarily be the understanding of a theistic approach to suffering and psychotherapy.
Theists, for example, may view depression as a form of necessary suffering for some
people to experience (Paul II, 1984; Hall et al., 2010). From this perspective, depression,
as a unique psychological (and perhaps physical) form of human suffering, could be a
way of sharing in God’s suffering to redeem mankind (Paul II, 1984). In the case of the
Christian theist, for example, “Suffering can lead to increasing conformity to the
character of Christ” or reorientation “toward the God who promises to redeem suffering
and who suffered with [mankind] in the form of the cross” (Hall et al., 2010, p. 120).
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Thus, suffering could have a broader meaning and a greater purpose in a theistic context;
indeed, suffering could take on special meaning in the hands of God (Hall et al., 2010),
suggesting that hedonism might not be the only natural or reasonable way to understand
depression (i.e., as bad), nor the only sensible way of approaching it (i.e., as a medical
condition).
A theistic approach to psychotherapy, then, would not necessarily consider all
forms or instances of depression as problems or inconveniences to be reduced, resolved,
or removed; rather, depression might also be seen as an experience that draws one closer
to God (Paul II, 1984), and thus to one’s own identity as a child of God. As one
participant in a qualitative study on depression and spirituality (Sorajjakool et al., 2008)
put it, “I feel this [depression] is all part of me getting to know God better… I see me
eventually getting closer, knowing him better” (p. 528). Depression, in this sense, might
not require “treatment” as much as being with the client through the suffering from the
part of the psychotherapist or mental health practitioner, and openness to exploring these
theistic meanings in a theistic context. A theistic psychotherapist might explore the
significance or meaning of a client’s experience of the suffering, and the crucial role that
his or her depression plays in that meaning, as well as entertain unique theistic
possibilities such as allowing God in the suffering to teach, succor, or prepare, or
enduring the suffering “righteously” (Paul II, 1984; Hall et al., 2010; Sorajjakool et al.,
2008).
Conclusion and Implications for Psychological Research
These different perspectives begin to illustrate how the initial philosophical
differences described concerning the natural world, regularities, and irregularities might
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have real and concrete practical and therapeutic implications for psychological events.
Since, contrary to conventional wisdom, theism not only has a perspective to offer on the
natural world, but a very different one compared to naturalism, it follows that theism has
something unique to say regarding the natural events that concern psychologists. This
also means that the compartmentalization of naturalism and theism by many theists
working as psychologists is problematic inasmuch as theism is seen to complement
naturalism. Rather, if the practical examples explored in this section are any indication,
then theism really is the most complete rival to naturalism, offering different or opposed
perspectives on the topics of psychology because their concerns directly overlap.
Given that theism and naturalism differ intellectually and practically, could they
also have different implications with respect to psychological research? The exposition
of some conceptual and practical differences between theism and naturalism in this
chapter evidences at least the potential for the consideration of a theistic program of
psychological research to be worthwhile because theism is different enough from
naturalism. It appears that the way in which theism depicts the natural, psychological
world can be substantially different from naturalistic approaches, and that theism could
be useful in psychology in a way that allows for different meanings in research to
emerge. Since psychology as it is currently constituted is a discipline of natural events,
the alternative understanding of natural events offered by theism suggests that it can add
both something new and different to the topics and methods that concern psychology.
Perhaps it could bring fresh insights into the psychological world.
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Chapter 3: What Does a Theistic Program of Psychological Research Call For
Conceptually?
At this juncture, I have attempted to establish that naturalism is a worldview, that
other worldviews than naturalism should be considered for psychological science, that
theism is a prime candidate for consideration, and that theism is a significantly different
set of explanations and hypotheses for even the natural events of psychology. Now the
question is: Can theism be rendered into a scientific program of psychological research?
Can it inform scientific investigation in ways that could lead to important new insights
into our psychological natures? Miller (2005) seems to assume in his challenge, “dare
we develop a theistic psychology” (emphasis added; p. 16), that it can, that a viable
theistic program of psychological research is possible, but, as I determined at the outset
of this thesis, this has not been sufficiently demonstrated. Therefore, in a manner of
speaking, I accept Miller’s dare to develop a theistic psychology by exploring in the
remainder of this thesis theism’s scientific and research potential in psychology.
Until this point, I explored only the justification for theism to be applied in a
scientific context for psychology. Since there is sufficient justification for this endeavor,
my task now becomes more prospective or forward-leaning. In other words, I now
attempt to show how a viable theistic program of psychological research could unfold,
thus taking another step toward answering the title question. But before I can explore
theism in a more practical scientific context, I must first examine what theism calls for at
a conceptual level and how it would affect the ways in which psychological science is
currently conducted.

62
Theism’s first premises are important, in this regard, so they will be explicated
and rendered into a workable scientific framework. A theistic framework has important
implications for the philosophy of science, research methods, and psychological subject
matter, so I explore each of these in turn in this chapter. A robust scientific conception of
theism would change researchers’ approaches to studying psychological topics, including
how they may understand and utilize existing research methods and psychological topics.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to outline and discuss the conceptual foundations and
considerations of a theistic program of psychological research that is directly applicable
to the process (i.e., method) and content (i.e., subject matter) of psychological research in
its current constitution. If this conceptually-oriented project is successful, it will provide
an organization to be implemented in the next chapter’s practical illustration of a
prospective program of theistic research in psychology.
What are Theism’s First Premises?
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the issue of first premises is important for
any scientific investigation, but it is often overlooked or under-examined in psychological
science because of naturalism’s bad monopoly and thus subsequent control of the criteria
of psychological science. Indeed, when Reber and Slife (2013a) explain that “important
aspects of the metaphysical and ontological subtly undergird and lead to the
methodological and epistemological” (p. 6), first premises are the “important aspects” to
which they refer, and what they mean by “subtly” is that first premises are often simply
taken for granted in most scientific investigations. In a certain respect, first premises
must be “taken for granted,” since, as I have already shown, every worldview has
unproven assumptions, i.e., first premises that cannot be proven empirically or logically
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(Harris, 2004; Reber & Slife, 2013a), and thus have to be “taken for granted” or “granted
for coherency.” But there is another sense in which taken for granted means that first
premises are reified or assumed to be established facts, like in the case of naturalism’s
natural laws, and therefore taken for granted, in this sense, can also indicate critical
unawareness by the psychological scientist or researcher (Reber & Slife, 2013a). A
theistic program of psychological research would rely on the former conception of what it
means to take first premises for granted because it recognizes, due to its contrast with its
main rival and its subsequent heightened critical sensibility (Slife & Zhang, 2014), the
impossibility of proving first premises, as some other unproven first premises would
necessarily have to be assumed in attempting to offer such a proof.
Theism’s first premises are further complicated by the variation of specific beliefs
between its worldview adherents. Recall that theism not only has many categorical and
subcategorical varieties (Johnson & Watson, 2012), but it also is assumed by many who
claim to be theists themselves to be fully compatible with or complementary to
naturalism and therefore is often syncretized into a dualistic or compartmentalized
conception that includes both naturalistic and seemingly theistic components (see Chapter
2). Both of these difficulties are overcome, however, by recognizing that one common
thread to any adequate conception of theism is how the activity or involvement of God is
conceptualized. Theism conceives of God as currently active, practically relevant, or
meaningfully involved in the world of psychological events (Slife et al., 2012), assuming
as its first premise that God is (or could be) engaged in a difference-making way in every
facet of the natural world, including all psychological events. Theism, in this sense, also
entails considering God’s activity as at least a necessary condition (among other
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necessary conditions) to fully understanding any psychological phenomenon (Slife &
Reber, 2009a).5
This first premise seems clear enough but there has been no shortage of backlash
against adopting this particular first premise (Helminiak, 2010, 2012, 2013; Alcock,
2009; Hibberd, 2009, 2012), for many of the same reasons previously identified as
objections to theism’s worldview candidacy. Naturalism’s first premise of natural laws,
critics might suggest, is more self-evident than theism’s premise of God’s involvement,
and therefore a theistic worldview would only present unnecessary difficulties and
challenges for psychological researchers, namely the detection of divine activity and the
inability to prove that such activity even exists (Hibberd, 2009, 2012). But it is important
to realize that the reason naturalism’s first premises appear more self-evident has more to
do with the mindset of those who accept the first premises (i.e., naturalists) than the
truthfulness of the premises (i.e., natural laws) themselves. Naturalists typically consider
their studies to be set up so as to detect natural laws and their significant findings as proof
that such laws exist. Hence, natural laws appear self-evident to naturalists because they
suppose that their successful studies prove the existence of these laws. This conclusion,
however, betrays rather than affirms their first premise, which already, a priori, makes
the assumption that such laws exist. Why would naturalists accept a first premise as true
or axiomatic at the beginning of their studies and then use the findings that follow as
proof that that first premise is true? They must be misunderstanding psychological
science and thus either misconceptualizing or misrepresenting naturalism. In either case,
what this means is upon clarifying this misunderstanding, naturalism’s first premises are
5

This would apply whether God is engaged or not. Even God’s lack of engagement,
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not really more self-evident than theism’s first premises, and the difficulties and
challenges associated with accepting theism’s first premises for investigation are
illusionary.
Theistic psychological researchers, on the other hand, properly recognize that
accepting first premises as axiomatic in an investigation means the purpose of the
investigation is not to prove the existence of those first premises. When they treat
the involvement of God as a first premise. This means… that the theist begins
with God’s involvement in the world, whether formulating a hypothesis, theory,
practice, or method of inquiring about the world. God is not a variable to be
studied but a premise to be assumed. In this sense, the theist does not formulate a
method of inquiry and then ask whether God exists or is involved, because this
does not treat the involvement of God as an assumption already made, which
would then guide the conduct of inquiry. (Slife & Reber, 2009b, p. 132)
Whether the involvement of God is actually true would not be the concern of theistic
psychologists, any more than the involvement of natural laws is actually true (or even
provable), since to them theism is just a worldview with as many unproven and unableto-be-proven assumptions or first premises as naturalism (Reber & Slife, 2013a; Harris,
2004). Thus, they recognize that the proper purpose of scientific investigation in
psychology is not to detect or prove these first premises to be true. Rather, theistic
psychologists would be concerned about how their particular worldview could affect or
change modes of scientific inquiry, including the sort of questions posed, the subject
matter explored, the methods deployed, and the explanations given; they would not deal
given the possibility of engagement, is a necessary condition.
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with theological questions any more than naturalists would deal with the philosophical
questions of naturalism.6 They would be more interested in whether their respective
worldview could predict and understand psychological phenomena.
Theistic psychologists would assume that God does act—though not knowing or
caring “exactly” how (which is a theological rather than a psychological question)—and
that God’s activity might be manifested in psychological events and processes.
My purpose is to show how psychologists can work within these most fundamental
understandings of the theistic worldview to conduct research that brings new
psychological findings and knowledge to the table. It is to perform a thought experiment,
so to speak, by assuming that God makes a current, practical difference in the
psychological world (though not knowing exactly how God acts in the world) and then to
see what this difference could mean for psychological science. Could this assumption
change a psychological researcher’s mentality and approach and still produce significant
and defensible findings?
Does Theism Require a Wholly Different Philosophy of Science?
Given the potentially radical implications of theism for psychological science,
some may assume that theism must necessarily require a wholly different philosophy of
science to naturalism. After all, if naturalism is the philosophy undergirding
psychology’s current research methods, as some claim (Johnson & Watson, 2012), then
these methods were adapted from or created based on the natural sciences to suit the
naturalistic worldview (Slife et al., 2012; Johnson & Watson, 2012). It might therefore
6

Interestingly, there exist just as many philosophical proofs of (and against) natural laws
as for (or against) the involvement of God, reflecting the philosophic rather than
scientific nature of these respective first premises.
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seem inconsistent or even implausible to combine the theistic worldview with naturalistic
methods that are biased in favor of and make the most sense when guided by the
naturalistic worldview.
Some may even assume that a theistic philosophy of science would be the best
alternative to the current naturalistic philosophy of science if theism is to be taken
seriously in psychology, and that such a philosophy of science should be formulated and
allow for the invention of new theistic methods of study. This is the reason Richards has
repeatedly championed epistemological and methodological pluralism for psychological
science (Richards & Bergin, 2005): to move toward a theistic philosophy of science.
Indeed, a theistic philosophy of science might entail exploring new and different
ontologies, epistemologies, methods, and approaches from the ones psychologists
currently use. As Slife et al. (2012) put it, a theistic philosophy of science could
contribute to new theistic “ways of advancing knowledge. After all, if theism is a wholly
different method worldview, then it has its own implications for how methods should be
developed” (p. 228). Such considerations would certainly be required for a
comprehensive program of theistic research in psychology.7 However, they are beyond
the scope of what I intend to accomplish with this thesis.
In this thesis, I attempt to explore another claim made by Slife et al. (2012), that a
theistic worldview “does not have to mean a wholly different philosophy of science, and
thus set of methods. Theism can move in the direction of another philosophy of
science… but we would argue that theism also has important practical implications for
conventional forms of inquiry” (p. 225). These authors seem to suggest that it would be
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wise to first consider how theism might affect psychology as it is currently constituted,
instead of developing a new philosophy of science altogether from the outset. If theism
could have “important practical implications for conventional forms of inquiry,” it makes
sense to attempt to work within some of these existing parameters rather than drastically
altering the prominent features of the discipline when there is no need to. But retaining a
large part of psychology’s current naturalistic identity in attempting to conceptualize a
theistic program of research raises some interesting questions: Can theism, the most
complete rival of naturalism (Slife et al., 2012), be applied in a setting designed, as some
would claim, by and for naturalism? Can psychologists conduct theistic research using
many of the existing conventions, methods, subdisciplines, and topics formed or founded
under naturalism?
Slife and Reber (2009b) suggest that theism can be employed in psychology in its
current naturalistic constitution. They explain that all research methods
are metaphorical hammers that are not biased against, and thus are neutral to, the
pounding of a variety of nails. Still, there are activities that hammers are “biased
against,” such as screwing screws and sawing boards. Translated into the present
context, our original claim was that the naturalistic philosophy underlying
traditional psychological inquiry makes it ill-suited (like the hammer) for theistic
inquiry (like the screws)… Theism is a different worldview, so it has its own
implications for methods. Still, even a hammer can pound a few screws, though
this is rarely ideal. (pp. 132-133).
7

See Slife and Whoolery (2006) and Johnson (2007) for some preliminary considerations
toward a theistic philosophy of science for psychology.
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In other words, this analogy suggests that carpenters usually attempt to fit the best tool to
the job at hand, but sometimes the exact right tool is not available. Another tool could be
used when this occurs, such as a hammer to pound a screw. This might not be as ideal as
using a screwdriver, but it can still get some semblance of the job done. Analogously,
naturalistic tools can be used, within limits, for some theistic purposes.
This is because the theistic worldview also has implications for the naturalistic
methods that were designed to investigate the natural world. After all, recall that theism
is also concerned with that same natural world. Theism is not simply about the
supernatural; it is just as interested in the natural as the supernatural, and as naturalism is.
In this sense, theism is concerned with different explanations and hypotheses concerning
natural events, not supernatural events. The upshot is that naturalists and theists view
natural events differently. That is, they are both interested in the same psychological
events, not to mention the regularities of the natural world, but they approach
psychological events with two different sets of lenses and therefore interpret these same
events differently (see Chapter 2).
Given that the success of naturalistic methods depends on a construal of the world
as consisting of natural events, and that theism also has something to say about natural
events, the existing research methods of psychology might be, in many ways, deployable
under a theistic worldview if they are themselves reinterpreted. Therefore, I will not
explore how theism might alter the methods used to conduct psychological inquiry under
a brand new philosophy of science. While this may be necessary for a full-fledged
theistic program of psychological research, the first practical application of theism to
psychology should have direct relevance to psychological science as it is currently
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constituted. The next inquiry, then, concerns how the current set of readily available
research methods in psychology can also be deployed within a theistic interpretation of
psychological subject matter, and of the methods themselves.
Are Existing Research Methods Capable of Theistic Deployment?
The purpose of this section is to explore implications for the research process
pertaining to the use of traditional research methods. These research methods seem to be
inspired by a naturalistic understanding of the psychological world (i.e., as lawful and
godless), so one may wonder whether they are adaptable to a theistic understanding and
thus retainable for a theistic program of research. It should be noted, in this regard, that I
have identified traditional research methods rather closely with naturalism. While this is
the prevailing conception, the methods themselves are not as essentially naturalistic as
people may think; they may avoid supernatural events, and are naturalistic in this sense,
but their concern with natural events, especially the regularity of these events, is also
shared by theism.
Since theism is also interested in the natural events of psychology and does not
require a new theistic philosophy of science be invented to have an effect on
psychological science, the question now is: Are the extant methods of psychological
science, namely quantitative and qualitative methods, open to investigation performed
under a theistic worldview? In other words, are these existing research methods capable
of theistic deployment? If the assumptions of these methods could be reinterpreted to
make sense according to a theistic view of reality, then quantitative and qualitative
methods could theoretically allow for designs and lead to findings that are
accommodating of theistic conceptions and explanations. Thus, in what follows, I
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explore in turn some of the most prominent features of quantitative and qualitative
methods to determine whether they can be justifiably deployed for scientific
investigations of psychological phenomena when guided by theism. In the case of
quantitative methods, I consider the lawfulness assumption undergirding natural events
and its implications for research design, while focusing on how the godlessness
assumption could limit the range of permissible meanings identifiable with qualitative
methods.
Quantitative methods. Although quantitative research methods have typically
been associated with a naturalistic approach to psychological inquiry, and the exclusive
use of quantitative methods has been questioned by some proponents of a theistic
approach to psychological science (Nelson, 2006), Tan (2006) and Slife and Reber
(2009b) note that these methods can and should still be implemented by theistic
psychological researchers. Tan (2006), for example, argues that “good science that uses
quantitative methods… can be appreciated with its philosophical and methodological
limitations freely acknowledged” (p. 262), and Slife and Reber (2009b), using a familiar
analogy, express that although “the naturalistic philosophy underlying traditional
psychological inquiry [quantitative research] makes it ill-suited (like the hammer) for
theistic inquiry (like the screws)” (Slife & Reber, 2009b, p. 132), “Still, even a hammer
can pound a few screws…” (p. 133). But in what sense is this possible? If quantitative
methods were formulated, as some claim, for the express purpose of identifying patterns
in an exclusively natural-law-oriented and -governed world, where exactly is the
openness to God’s involvement? How could theism possibly fit within the quantitative
framework? The answer lies in recognizing how the lawful picture of natural events is

72
painted differently by naturalism and theism in respect to the features of quantification,
empiricism, operationalization, and replication that undergird quantitative methods. As I
will show, theists can have different interpretations and explanations of natural
lawfulness and therefore of these methods.
Quantification. The identifying feature of quantitative methods is the
quantification or measurement of natural phenomena, i.e., comprehending the natural
world in numerical terms. Quantification or measurability, in this sense, requires that
natural events be translated into numbers, hence the importance and prevalence of scales
and measures in psychological research. When psychologists construct items to measure
psychological phenomena, they do so in a way that takes into consideration the regularity
of the natural, psychological events measured and then subject their data to analysis. The
quantifying of data, in this sense, is not restricted to a naturalistic interpretation of those
data, because data are underdetermined (Slife & Williams, 1995; Melling, 2009; Slife &
Reber, 2009b). This means that theistic interpretations could possibly also be offered of
data, since natural events and their regularity are equally accessible by and applicable to
theism as naturalism. Moreover, since many quantitative measures and scales contain
people’s self-reported experiences, there is no reason, in principle, that experiences
related to God could not be measured in this same way (Reber et al., 2012).
Empiricism. The narrow brand of British empiricism that is the eminent
epistemology of conventional (naturalistic) psychological science regards only what is
observable as knowable (Slife & Slife, 2014; Slife & Melling, 2008). Many
psychological scientists understand natural laws to fit this criterion (Slife & Whoolery,
2006), while the activity of God is not considered to be observable in the same way—
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hence the conventional outlook that even if God were active in the world there would be
no way to observe the activity of such an unseen divine being. It is important to note,
however, that natural laws themselves are actually also unobservable entities, just like
God. Although the postulated manifestations of these laws are observable, the laws
themselves are not (Slife et al., 2012; Slife & Zhang, 2014). The laws are unseen entities
inferred from the manifestations they supposedly govern, e.g., the law of gravity behind
the manifestation of a basketball returning to the ground after it is shot through a ring.
Like natural laws, “God is an unseen entity that supposedly governs or influences world
manifestations” (Slife et al., 2012, p. 224), and there is no reason that inferences cannot
also be made about God’s activity in the world in much the same way (Slife & Zhang,
2014). Natural laws are no more observable than God’s activity, in this sense. Put
another way, natural laws are one interpretation of natural events while God’s activity is
a different interpretation of those events—there is nothing more observable about a
naturalistic interpretation (involving natural laws) compared to a theistic interpretation
(based on God’s activity) of natural events.
Operationalization. Operationalization, in a related manner, turns the
unobservable or unreportable into the observable or reportable. As Slife and Melling
(2008) put it, “When some unobservable subject matter is of interest… empiricist
epistemology requires that the psychological researcher ‘operationalize’ and thus
translate these unobservable constructs into observable procedures or operations” (p. 45).
The postulated manifestations of either natural laws or God’s activity just described are
operationalizations because the observable (i.e., manifestations) represents the
unobservable. In naturalism’s case, its operationalizations are based on a naturalistic
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interpretation of the regularity and order of natural world events. Theism offers an
alternative interpretation but, as I have already shown, one that is also consistent with the
world’s regularity and order (see Chapter 2). This means that theism will have its own
operationalizations, as will naturalism, because operationalizations will vary with respect
to the interpretive framework in which they are formulated. Although theism may seem
at a higher level of abstraction than naturalism, and thus appear more to difficult to
operationalize, natural laws are really not any less abstract than divine activity, in which
case theism can lead to constructs and operationalizations just like naturalism. Because
operationalizations can only occur in the context of a preexisting interpretive framework
that makes sense of the phenomena in a particular way, theism is just as
operationalizable, in this sense, as naturalism.
Replication. The feature of replication or replicability that is so important to
quantitative methods seems to be based on a naturalistic interpretation of regularity,
whereby natural laws are assumed to be operating continuously without any deviation in
the natural world. As Slife and Whoolery (2006) put it, because
unchangeable and universal natural laws and principles are [assumed to be] the
most fundamental realities of the world… natural science [i.e., quantitative]
methods have been formulated to detect these unchangeable and universal laws.
The need for replication and repeatability in psychology is perhaps the most
obvious manifestation of this formulation of the scientific method, because
unchangeable natural laws should be detectable and repeatable (under the same
conditions). (p. 223).
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Experimental conditions are taken to be equivalent to “real world” conditions since these
laws are meant to hold no matter the setting or context, and research findings must be
replicable to be considered valid for this reason—i.e., the more a particular finding can be
replicated, especially across different populations, the more likely it can be considered to
reflect a natural law in operation.
While theism is open to findings that are not replicable (i.e., irregularities8), it is
also just as concerned with the patterns and regularities of the world, and therefore
endorses this replication feature of quantitative methods as much as naturalism. This is
so because theists see God as providing natural regularity for predictability and
rationality. A totally unpredictable world would not be sensible or meaningful, not to
mention uninhabitable. A world of regularities, on the other hand, is predictable and
habitable. In this sense, God is seen as involved in the continuing operation of natural
laws; according to Plantinga (1997), “natural laws are not in any way independent of
God, and are perhaps best thought of as regularities in the ways in which he treats the
stuff he has made…” Therefore, a theistic interpretation considers that God provides a
world consisting of regularities for the sake of those inhabiting the world. For this
reason, a theistic interpretation of worldly regularities would emphasize replication no
less than a naturalistic interpretation.
Conclusion. These four features of quantitative methods—quantification,
empiricism, operationalization, and replication—can clearly be reinterpreted with an
openness and sensitivity toward divine action; they are thus not opposed to theism in
principle, as many suppose. The lawfulness assumption of the naturalism that undergirds
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these features is, therefore, only as godless as the naturalists behind it. Perhaps more
importantly, quantitative methods can be deployed to investigate God’s postulated
activity in psychological events without having to diminish or eliminate the importance
of the methods’ standard features.
Qualitative methods. Traditional qualitative research methods, like traditional
quantitative methods, are also not necessarily or ideally applicable to theistic research in
psychology given their non-theistic foundation. To be sure, the worldview of qualitative
methods is a different worldview than that of quantitative methods (Packer, 2011; Slife &
Melling, 2012), but “both quantitative and qualitative researchers have typically adopted
different forms of naturalism, and thus have agreed on the a priori dismissal of theistic
theorizing” (Slife & Zhang, 2014, p. 1946). In other words, qualitative researchers, like
quantitative researchers, do not typically postulate that God matters in the formulation or
deployment of their methods. While qualitative methods do not emphasize the
lawfulness feature of naturalism as much as quantitative methods, the secular and social
foundation of the qualitative method worldview assumes a functional godlessness.
However, these methods might be somewhat more open to or compatible with
theism in ways that reflect the unique features of the qualitative worldview. Consider, for
instance, Nelson’s (2006) argument that
Qualitative methods…are more open to the kinds of values and methods… of a
theistic framework of inquiry. Qualitative studies are (1) driven by phenomenon
rather than method, (2) involve an examination of potential biases, (3) establish a
relational engagement with the participants that encourages the investigator to act
8

Irregularities will be addressed under the following section regarding qualitative
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out of love and care toward the people being studied, and (4) explicitly look for
unpredictable events [i.e., irregularities] that challenge current conceptions of a
phenomenon (cf. Gorsuch, 2002; Slife & Whoolery, 2006). Obviously, the use of
these methods does not guarantee a place for theism, but appropriately used the
methods provide a space where theistically-informed inquiry can be conducted.
(p. 278).
Nelson’s defense of qualitative methods suggests that these methods could be deployed in
ways that take God’s practical activity and involvement seriously. But how exactly could
this occur when qualitative methods are typically associated with features such as
phenomenology, social constructionism, subjectivity, and relativism that, in a
conventional sense, seem to exclude genuinely theistic meanings? Like Nelson, Slife and
Melling (2008) claim that “the assumptions associated with qualitative methods (and
methodology) may be more compatible with some [theistic] investigative questions” (p.
46). But how might they be more compatible when qualitative methods typically assume
a godless worldview? Can qualitative methods, like quantitative methods, be understood
in a different manner than that dictated by tradition to allow for truly theistic possibilities
to be taken into account? Specifically, can the features of phenomenology, social
constructionism, subjectivity, and relativism that are typically associated with qualitative
methods take theistic meanings seriously if understood in a less conventional but perhaps
more proper sense?
Phenomenology. If quantification is the primary means by which quantitative
methods operate, then phenomenology, or the foregrounding of lived human experience,
methods.
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is its qualitative counterpart. Qualitative researchers, therefore, tend to “emphasize the
goal of understanding the ‘lived experiences’ (Erlebnis) from the point of view of those
who live it day to day” (Ponterotto, 2005, p. 129). From this phenomenological
perspective, experiences involving God could be taken just as seriously as any other
experience. That is to say, many experience God in their daily lives, so it is important to
understand these experiences and not relegate them to a different category of experience
that is somehow distinguishable from more “concrete” or “tangible” experiences.
On the other hand, when qualitative researchers think they are taking experiences
of God seriously, they are often participating in the overlooked tendency of
understanding theistic experiences in secular terms (Roehlkepartain et al., 2005; Smith,
2003). In other words, theistic experiences are often simply considered “religious”
experiences, no different than experiences of one’s class, gender, race, or sexuality as
features of one’s identity. This is so because religion is understood in the image of
secularism (Calhoun, Juergensmeyer & VanAntwerpen, 2011), as no more than an
institutional embodiment of one’s personal values. When experiences with a divine
being are believed to be no more than some form of religious (i.e., secular) identity- or
meaning-making, a person’s lived experience is somewhat discounted because the
meaning-making is not in the service of a God (or does not stem from a God); it
originates from the person and is thus assumed to be in the service of the person—a point
of view inconsistent with most religions. In this sense, secular understandings can be
functionally equated to godlessness. The upshot is this godlessness is not derived from
the phenomenological “point of view” of those experiencing God, in which case the
phenomenologist or qualitative researcher is not truly open to the phenomenology of their
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participants. Properly understood, phenomenology should be open to lived experiences
involving God without secularizing these experiences.
Social constructionism. The godlessness of qualitative methods is also evident in
the epistemology often associated with these methods (Darlaston-Jones, 2007): social
constructionism. There are two different but related issues concerning how theism is
conventionally understood within a social constructionist framework. The first issue
concerns social processes—according to Richardson and Slife (2013), “social
constructionism retains the claim that knowledge is ‘the product of social processes’
(Burr, 1995, p. 4). So, in this sense, social processes can be considered the only relevant
reality from a social constructionist perspective” (p. 8), meaning the very notion of God
itself is the product of social processes. This often results in what might be termed
“social reductionism,” “that dismisses religious or spiritual phenomena as expressions of
something else. ‘What appears to be divine or spiritual or transcendent or pious or sacred
are really only about social class, race, gender, ethnicity, nationalism, solidarity, social
control, and so on’ (Smith, 2003, p. 19)” (Roehlkepartain et al., 2005, p. 3). But “If
experiences of God are simply social constructions… God… is again rendered
functionally non-existent” (Richardson & Slife, 2013, p. 9). The whole concept and
being of God, in other words, is reduced to some level of social construction because this
epistemology implies that any understanding involving God can only make sense in terms
of a social reality that is constructed only by human beings. The God of theism is “not
simply a socially constructed concept of God” (p. 9), however, leading straight to the
next issue.
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The second issue deals with God’s possible involvement in or as part of these
social processes. God is typically not considered to play an active role in these social
processes or social constructions, whether they involve constructions of God or not.
Instead, social processes and constructions are usually considered to be mere human
construction, as if invented ex nihilo without God contributing to the construction in
some manner. However, as Slife (2012) explains,
many spiritual and religious traditions… claim their propositions and meanings
are more than merely human constructions (Netland, 2001). This is not to say that
many religions would not acknowledge a constructive or interpretive element in
many lived religious meanings. Nevertheless, it is one thing to assume that this
element is one factor in the lived experience of religious people and quite another
to assume that this constructionist element is the factor (see Slife and Richardson,
in press). (p. 806).
In the specific case of theism, God could be involved as a co-constructor in a person’s
constructions, but the narrow version of this social constructionist epistemology excludes
this possibility a priori and therefore maintains a commitment to godlessness.
However, qualitative researchers need not limit themselves to such a narrow
version of this epistemology, and thus the immanent frame of a social world that stems
from it. If qualitative methods are not unnecessarily confined to a narrow social
constructionist epistemology, they could also be open to interpretations and meanings
that fit the transcendent frame of a divine world permitted by theism, without reducing
them to purely social processes and human constructions when taking these factors into
consideration. God is not simply the product of a social construction, in this regard;
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rather, God could be taken seriously as a co-constructor of knowledge. A hermeneutic
inclination for qualitative research could prove helpful to avoiding the sort of social
reductionism as well as the a priori exclusion of God as a potential co-constructor that
frequently accompany social constructionist accounts because such an inclination situates
understanding in the experience of meanings broadly construed (Slife, 2012; Reber &
Slife, 2013a) and thus not limited to a purely social reality or merely human construction.
Subjectivity. A hermeneutic approach could not only expand the narrowness or
correct the misunderstandings of social constructionism; it could also allow for
qualitative research to be meaning-oriented rather than merely subject-oriented (Reber &
Slife, 2013a; Slife & Richardson, in press). While many qualitative researchers seek to
avoid the modernist dualism of objectivity/subjectivity that prioritizes objectivity, they
have equated meanings with the other side of the dualism: subjectivity. Thus, many have
understood meanings, especially those involving God, to be purely subjective
experiences,9 i.e., contained in the subject, and therefore bearing no practical implications
for the world (or object) per se. Reber and Slife (2013a) correct this misconception,
however, by noting that
the conventional, dualistic notion of meaning… is a distinctly subjective entity,
[while] the hermeneutic conception… understands meaning as constituted by both
subjectivity and objectivity in an interpreted reality that is not merely subjective
speculation about an objective world out there (Gadamer, 1997). From the
hermeneutic perspective we live with and through the world, not as subjects over
against objects, but as participants in a world of co-constituted meanings where
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ontological distinctions between subjects and objects are not experienced and
consequently a subjectivity/objectivity dualism does not arise (Heidegger, 1962).
(p. 11).
In this sense, theistic meanings involving the experience of a divine being
are not ungrounded ideas (Gadamer, 1997; Warnke, 1994). Meanings do not refer
to the contents of the mind of the interpreter [subjectivity] or to the objects in
themselves [objectivity]. Instead, they are mutually constituted by the interpreter,
interpretive context, and the thing interpreted (Heidegger, 1962). In terms
familiar to the dualist, they are inextricably interpreted realities—subjective
objectivities or objective subjectivities—with neither the ‘subjective’ nor the
‘objective’ aspects of these meanings separable from one another (Slife, Reber, &
Faulconer, 2012). (Reber & Slife, 2013a, p. 15).
The point is that under a hermeneutic paradigm God is not simply assumed to be a
subjective entity in a person’s consciousness. Qualitative methods can thus be
sympathetic toward theistic meanings, if framed hermeneutically, because hermeneutics
entails that a person’s meaning of God’s involvement in his or her life events is as
potentially “grounded” and thus “real,” in this sense, as any other meanings, making God
functionally relevant from this perspective. Some forms of qualitative methods would
thus be conducive to theism because they can presume a theistic interpretive reality in
order to make sense of theistic meanings and possibilities.
Relativism. Such a hermeneutic approach to qualitative research also avoids the
relativism that devolves from the conventional notion of subjectivity, whereby “a
9

Some might even say that experiences of God are the most subjective of experiences
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detachment of meaning from the objects that constrain that meaning would lead to an
idealist or subjectivist ideology and a rampant relativism” (emphasis added, Reber &
Slife, 2013b, p. 67). This kind of relativism suggests complete epistemological
ungroundedness and resists any claim to truth, especially when the involvement of a
“subjective entity” such as God is concerned. This relativistic understanding of
ungroundedness, however, differs from the groundedness of hermeneutics. That is to say,
relativism posits “that the truths and moralities of the world are completely ungrounded”
(Slife, 2012, p. 806), while hermeneutics understands that “the context of any event puts
parameters on the interpretations of constructions that can reasonably be made of the
event” (emphasis added, p. 806).
Because meanings and interpretations are grounded in the object or event, for the
hermeneuticist, some meanings and interpretations will necessarily be more acceptable
and truthful than others, and vice versa. For example, “Consider the… ethical event of a
large truck accidentally hitting a small girl. Some [interpretations] of this event simply
are not reasonably available, such as referring to the mangled and bleeding girl as being
‘beautiful’ or ‘delightful’” (p. 806). On the other hand, the relativist would, from
subscribing to ungroundedness, be equally open to all interpretations or meanings
because any hard truth is altogether avoided. “If, by contrast, world meanings can be
understood to be grounded in the lived and ethical world, then they can be understood to
reflect a practical truth and a meaningful reality. The meaning of the truck hitting the
little girl is some variation on ‘tragedy,’ because there is a meaningful reality to her
suffering or death” (p. 806). In this sense, interpretations do not come solely from the
(Slife & Zhang, 2014).
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interpreter, as the ungroundedness of relativism would entail; rather, interpretations arise
from the relationship between the interpreter and that which is interpreted, i.e., what
grounds any interpretation (and thus affords particular interpretations). In the
hermeneutic sense, theistic meanings can embody a form of truthfulness derived from a
theistic interpretive reality in which these meanings are grounded and afforded.
Conclusion. When the qualitative features of phenomenology, social
constructionism, subjectivity, and relativism are understood in conventional terms,
theistic meanings and understandings are often reduced or relegated to the secular, social,
subjective, and/or relativistic realms. As I have shown, however, these features can also
be approached in less conventional, more hermeneutic ways that take theistic meanings
seriously. Some might even say, in this regard, that the qualitative worldview and its
research implications have not been properly understood under the more conventional,
more secular or naturalistic lens (Packer, 2011). Hermeneutics embodies qualitative
inquiry more appropriately (Packer, 2011), in this regard, displaying a unique openness to
a theistic interpretive system because of its distinct focus on meanings and truth, and
thereby granting theistic meanings a level of validity not conferred by conventional
approaches.
In What Ways Would Theism Change Conventional Forms of Inquiry in
Psychology?
Now that it is apparent traditional research methods can be reinterpreted and
deployed according to a theistic worldview, theistic implications for the subject matter of
psychology should be considered. Recall Slife et al.’s (2012) argument that “theism also
has important practical implications for conventional forms of inquiry” (p. 225). As I
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have already shown, some of these practical implications are directly related to the
deployment of methods, i.e., the process of research. But what are the practical
implications for the conventional content of psychological research, the other necessary,
and perhaps more significant, aspect of any inquiry? I will explore three such
implications in this section: First, existing subdisciplines of psychology can be
approached theistically. Second, psychological topics and events that are traditionally
and substantively theistic can, for perhaps the first time, be studied within a theistic
framework. Third, traditionally secular topics and subjects that are typically seen to have
little or nothing to do with God can be “reconceptualized and rendered theistically” (Slife
et al., 2012, p. 228). The purpose of this section is not to provide extensive examples or
to show how specific studies might look; rather, it is to offer guidelines as to how theism
would approach existing psychological subject matter in a program of research. These
guidelines will be followed and the resulting template implemented in the following
chapter. What this section provides is simply the promise for the prospect.
Approaching secular psychological subdisciplines theistically. As to the first
area of psychological content, it should be noted that “theistic psychology” is not itself a
subdiscipline of psychology so much as it is a way of thinking about the various
subdisciplines of psychology, such as social psychology, clinical psychology, or any
other subdiscipline. Theistic psychology would not have to focus on its own exclusive
set of topics, theories, and practices, as most subdisciplines of psychology do, although
this would certainly be a possibility with a full-fledged theistic psychology. Rather, the
main concern in light of holding onto the discipline of psychology in its current
constitution, one of the purposes of this project, is to move theism into a more
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conventional psychology that is already familiar to most. Since theism, as we have
already discussed, is also concerned with the natural events of the psychological world, it
remains to be seen how theism would systematically interpret these events. An
appropriate starting point, then, is by theistically addressing one or another existing
secular psychological subdiscipline that brings together a constellation of related natural,
psychological events and processes.
Theistic psychology, in this regard, would function like evolutionary psychology,
which offers a perspective on or approach to all of psychology (Liddle & Shackelford,
2011), including, potentially, all of its different subdisciplines, and is not simply its own
subdiscipline per se. Evolutionary psychology embodies a systematic way of
approaching the study of different psychological subjects based on evolutionary theory
(Lidde & Shackelford, 2011), which is also arguably the quintessential theoretical
embodiment of naturalism (Plantinga, 2011), having implications for both the origins and
current bases of human behavior. The tenets of theism, on the other hand, have not been
similarly considered because traditional debates have largely been limited to that of
evolution against creation. While evolutionary theory offers a perspective on the
ongoing, present influences on behavior, e.g., adaptation, creationism does not because it
is focused mostly on the issue of origins. Thus, creationism is not the best representation
of theism since theism, like evolution, also has implications for current behavioral
influences. Moreover, theism provides different interpretations of the same natural
events. Even evolutionary explanations can be understood from a theistic perspective
(Plantinga, 2011), such as survival and reproduction, with the same number and kind of
unprovable assumptions (Reber & Slife, 2013a).
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Approaching the secular subdisciplines of psychology theistically, then, requires
that God’s current activity be postulated as at least a necessary condition among other
necessary conditions in the constitution and explanation of psychology’s subdisciplinary
content, i.e., the order of a set of natural psychological events. It would require looking
at the specific topics, concepts, theories, and ideas that are studied in any given
subdiscipline in a theistic way. It would also require considering any explanation that
does not include God as a necessary condition as either incomplete or wrong. This way
of changing conventional explanation and inquiry could also entail contextualizing and
illuminating the naturalism of a subdiscipline via historical or theoretical inquiry (e.g.,
Slife & Reber, 2009a). Finally, it also encompasses the following two ways of
approaching specific topics theistically, since the topics studied in psychology are
typically organized under one or another subdiscipline.
Studying theistic topics theistically. The second way that theism could change
the content in conventional lines of inquiry concerns the study of psychological topics
that are typically viewed as theistic or as associated with theism, namely religious and
spiritual topics and events. Until now, a theistic approach to topics traditionally
associated with theism has generally been lacking because “systematic biases against a
theistic interpretative framework have led the discipline to avoid considering theism in
the formulation and interpretation of psychological theories and research, even when that
research is focused on seemingly theistic topics” (Slife & Reber, 2009a, p. 72). Consider,
for example, the psychology of religion, which, despite displaying openness to the study
of theistic content and topics such as prayer, worship, forgiveness, and image-of-God,
often approaches and interprets these topics in naturalistic ways that are inconsistent with
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and sometimes even opposed to the ways theists themselves understand these topics
(Slife & Reber, 2012; Slife & Reber, 2009a), such as conventional image-of-God
research that overlooks experiences with God as a factor in the formation of a person’s
image-of-God (Reber et al., 2012; O’Grady & Richards, 2008; Slife & Reber, 2009a).
While psychology-of-religion studies that understand theistic topics in a naturalistic way
undoubtedly reveal important aspects about these topics, they also conceal other
important aspects (Reber & Slife, 2013a). Allowing the theistic worldview to guide such
studies could not only reveal important theistic aspects for perhaps the first time, but also
prevent any misunderstanding or misrepresentation of theists or theistic practices (Slife &
Reber, 2012).
A whole program of research could be devoted to the study of theistic topics in
psychology and the psychology of theists under the interpretive framework of the theistic
worldview that takes God’s involvement into account. Indeed, many existing studies
related to the psychology of religion could be modified and replicated with sensitivity
towards theism, such as an image-of-God study that actually considers experiences with
God as possibly contributing to that image (see Reber et al., 2012 for such a theistically
modified study). Moreover, traditionally theistic topics have also been investigated in
tandem with traditionally nontheistic psychological content such as mental health,
addiction, neuroscience, etc. When topics are combined in this way, theistic
understandings of theistic topics would also change how traditionally nontheistic content
is investigated. For example, if one were to study the effects of prayer (a theistic topic)
on addiction (nontheistic content), a theistic change in conceptualizing prayer would also
lead to a theistic change in understanding addiction. It would not take many procedural
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changes to approach the study of theistic topics theistically, whether they are studied
within their own parameters or in relation to traditionally nontheistic topics, although
attention to detail would be necessary since the theistic nature of these topics may give
the impression that they are already being studied theistically when they are really not.
Reconceptualizing secular topics theistically. The third way in which theism
can change the naturalistic content of conventional psychological inquiry takes the
secular or naturalistic topics of psychology directly into consideration. Can
psychological topics that are so traditionally secular it is even difficult for theists to
imagine how God could have any practical relevance to these topics also be studied with
regard to theism? Slife et al. (2012) “argue that even traditionally secular psychological
topics [such as prosocial behavior] can be reconceptualized and rendered theistically” (p.
228; see also Melling, 2009). For many theists, for example, the possibility of God
prompting a person to engage in altruistic and loving behaviors is quite reasonable, so to
study prosocial behavior within a theistic interpretive framework, though it may be more
difficult, is not all that farfetched. But could this also be true for topics that are radically
secular, “topics that are often not considered to be connected with God at all, such as
neuroscience and child development” (p. 222)? Slife et al. argue that the conceptual
differences of theism can also lead to practical research differences for radically secular
topics since “This extension to less traditional topics derives from the thoroughgoing
variety of theism” (p. 222). Although, from this perspective, God could be potentially
involved in even the most radically secular of topics, no formal theistic
reconceptualizations along these lines have yet to be offered, which raises the question of
how or whether secular topics can be rendered theistically. Can existing theories and
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programs of research be reconceptualized? Can original studies be designed based on
theistic reconceptualizations? Answering these questions is the purpose of the next
chapter.
Conclusion
The conceptual foundations of a theistic program of psychological research
explored in this chapter lay an agenda to be followed for a practical research program.
This agenda suggests not only that the traditional research methods already used by
psychological researchers could be reinterpreted to have application to theistically-guided
investigation; it also considers ways in which the existing subject matter of psychology
can be reconceptualized and researched with theistic proclivities. Thus, the discipline of
psychology need not be recreated in the image of theism, as a new philosophy of science
might require. Rather, psychology in its current constitution as a discipline of natural
events and conventional methods seems suited to the possibility of some forms of
research that is done within a theistic interpretive framework, as a matter of principle.
Now the question is whether the principle can be transformed into practice. Can the
conceptual roots of theistic research presented in this chapter prove to be a reliable
template for future studies and prospective programs of research in psychology?
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Chapter 4: What Would a Practical Program of Theistic Research Look Like?
The previous chapter’s exploration suggests the conceptual or technical viability
of deploying quantitative and qualitative methods for theistic research if these methods
are reconstrued from a theistic worldview, and of investigating the current subject matter
of psychology theistically. There appears to be a certain scientific utility to theism, not
unlike conventional naturalistic approaches to psychological research. That is to say, it
seems that theism could be appropriately applied in the context of psychological research
with many of the same conventions used by naturalism, but utility and application need to
be demonstrated and established, not simply claimed or envisioned. Therefore, in this
chapter, I explore whether the conceptual template or agenda articulated in the previous
chapter can be applied in a practical psychological context. The purpose of this chapter,
in other words, is to provide an illustration of theism’s practical viability in guiding
psychological research.
Given the vast diversity of psychology, there are potentially many programs of
research by which such an illustration could be imparted. Since space limitations prohibit
an extensive treatment of all such programs, I will only highlight a few in this chapter.
For the sake of more fully developing one particular strand of theistic research, my
specific focus will be within the subdiscipline of developmental psychology. Not only is
developmental psychology one of the most celebrated and influential subdisicplines in
the field of psychology; it also represents the gamut of psychological concerns, has an
expansive tradition of theorizing, and studies a variety of populations, while focusing
unyieldingly on methodological rigor (Miller, 2010). For these reasons, it is an ideal
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starting point with respect to conceptualizing a prospective program of theistic
psychological research.
This chapter will be separated into two major sections. While both sections
concern developmental psychology, the first section addresses a traditionally secular
topic while the second section examines a traditionally theistic topic. The initial purpose
of each section is to show how conventional approaches to the topics studied are not
theistic, and how theistic reconceptualizations of these topics would look. Because
developmental psychology is heavily infused with theory, I will draw topics from within
a major theory in each section. The main purpose of this chapter is to show how theistic
reconceptualizations lead to new and different predictions, hypotheses, and research
questions and how one can go about investigating these differences with quantitative and
qualitative methods. I will illustrate how all this can be done in each major section.
Because these are trailblazing illustrations, they will necessarily be somewhat crude and
thus unrefined. Nevertheless, they will sufficiently demonstrate how practical theistic
psychological research can be done.
Cognitive Development
From its inception, developmental psychology has been distinctly secular, with its
main historical thrust being to move away from theistic explanations. Vandenberg and
O’Connor (2005) identify, in this vein, that developmental psychology was born in the
era of Nietzschian nihilism that proclaimed God to be “dead.” Therefore, developmental
psychology’s roots hinge largely on naturalistic assumptions, theories, and methods,
“presum[ing] a [naturalistic] worldview that differs, radically, from the prior, dominant,
theological cosmology” (p. 190). Indeed, its guiding naturalistic assumption is that
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“Change results from material (biologically derived) forces immanent in the system, not
from transcendental acts of God outside the system” (p. 192). The main area of
developmental psychology, cognitive development, manifests this assumption in its
theories in several ways. Not only is cognitive development viewed as a godless, natural
process shaped by natural laws (i.e., material forces), but godless, logico-mathematical,
scientific thinking is held to be the touchstone of cognitive advancement. In other words,
the endgame to cognitive development is when “young children’s animism and magical
thinking about the physical world is supplanted by logical thinking and [naturalistic]
scientific understanding” (p. 192). Since cognitive development is constituted by and
laden with such godless understandings and naturalistic undertones, it is not surprising
that most of its research topics are radically secular topics, entirely disassociated with
theism. These topics are so secular that many people, including theists, may think they
cannot be understood in any other way than secularly, or naturalistically. In this section,
I will show that, contrary to this conventional wisdom, even secular topics can be
reconceptualized and rendered theistically. Jean Piaget’s seminal cognitive-stage theory
will provide the secular context for this theistic reconceptualization.
Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, perhaps the most emblematic theory in
all of developmental psychology, outlines several stages children undergo before they can
think abstractly and solve problems scientifically. Instead of addressing the specific
stages of Piaget’s theory, I will focus on the overall pattern of reasoning as children age
and the manner in which learning takes place according to his theory. Cognitive
development, as I will describe, concerns both the content of cognitions (i.e., thoughts
and explanations) and the process behind knowledge acquisition (i.e., learning and
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epistemology). Both the content and the process of cognitive development as conceived
by Piaget’s theory uncritically validate naturalism while excluding theism, so it is
important to understand how this is so and to describe what a theistic reconceptualization
would entail for each of these aspects. Research implications for these theistic
reconceptualizations will also be considered in what follows; that is to say, I will show
that different research hypotheses and questions will come about and how they can be
investigated using quantitative and qualitative methods.
Content: Intuitive theists. The content of cognitive development concerns what
children understand, i.e., how they reason about and understand the world. According to
Piaget’s theory, the ways in which children understand the world will “move from
primitive concepts to more objective and scientific concepts” (Harris, 2009, p. 229) as
their cognition and intelligence develop. When younger children conceptualize
causation, for instance, they often do so in a way that involves magical thinking, but as
they learn to think scientifically they will begin to adopt mechanical causal explanations
(Harris, 2009; Rosengren & Gutierrez, 2011). This developmental progression suggests
that children may use explanations that involve God or teleology when they are younger
but these explanations represent “an earlier, more primitive stage of intelligence”
(Vandenberg & O’Connor, 2005, p. 201), or magical thinking, which is “superseded by a
more advanced stage marked by logic, reason, and scientific analysis” (p. 201). The
implication is that understanding the events of the world in theistic ways is a rudimentary
form of understanding that will eventually be replaced with correct naturalistic
explanations, and that children who do not move away from theistic explanations and
toward naturalistic explanations are not developing properly.
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Piaget’s premises are substantiated by Kelemen’s empirical research (2004) that
shows young children appear to be “intuitive theists,” as if they are “predisposed to
construe natural objects as though [these objects] are nonhuman artifacts, the products of
nonhuman design” (p. 295). Because “Children view natural phenomena as intentionally
designed by a God [i.e., intelligent design]… they… view natural objects as existing for a
purpose [i.e., animism]” (p. 296). The conventional logic behind cognitive development
would automatically assume that children are intuitive theists because they have not yet
developed the structures and intelligence to fully understand the mechanical causes
behind natural objects, and that they would ultimately become intuitive scientists once
they can grasp these causes (Kelemen, 2004). Thus, to be an intuitive theist means that
one’s thinking has not yet matured and is akin to “magical thinking.” Intuition, in this
case, has a negative connotation since it is not considered to lead to correct knowledge,
which means the intuition is flawed.
Reconceptualization. A theistic reconceptualization of this understanding of
children as intuitive theists would not carry the same kind of negative connotation.
Instead, it would consider that children’s innate intuition to understand the world they
live in in theistic ways might point to an actual theistic influence on their thinking. After
all, research has suggested that “very young children all over the world, often despite
their parents’ own beliefs, seem to generate concepts of God” (King and Roeser, p. 447),
including studies by Evans (2000, 2001) showing that children explain the origins of the
world and of natural objects in theistic ways regardless of whether they grow up in a
secular or religious home. As Barrett and Burdett (2011) suggest, “Perhaps such
evidence could even be used as part of an argument affirming a divinely implanted
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receptivity to the transcendent” (p. 255). Indeed, there may be a certain value and
practical relevance in considering children as intuitive theists that is missed when God is
taken out of the equation. Being an intuitive theist could instead mean that God allows a
way for children to begin to understand the purposes God has for the world in which they
are born. Perhaps the purity associated with “little children” in the scriptural sense,
according to Christian theists (Gundry-Volf, 2000), also applies to the way they
understand and think about their world. Taking this perspective seriously would mean
the theistic explanations young children give to natural events may not actually be all that
wrong and do not need to be replaced so much as refined or cultivated as children
develop. Perhaps the naturalistic explanations of the received view (and the desired
developmental outcome) are lacking because they do not account for God’s involvement
in natural events.
The most practical implications of this reconceptualization are those pertaining to
education, since children spend most of their waking days at school than anywhere else.
Nord (2010) suggests that there is a “scientific naturalism” operating in every course of
study, which guarantees a “secular mentality that marginalizes and… discredits
contending religious [i.e., theistic] interpretations” (p. 91). Thus, children are taught to
“block out of consideration all but the secular viewpoint” (Feinberg, 2013, p. 433).
Schooling, in other words, is specifically geared toward turning children away from their
intuitive theism. But if their intuition really is not wrong, discouraging them from
theistic explanations may lead to negative psychological effects, such as cognitive
dissonance and disengagement. Conversely, encouraging these theistic intuitions may
mean that children will show more engagement as well as enthusiasm toward their
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learning. This alternative understanding of children’s intuitive theism would lead to new
studies and investigations.
Research. If children are discouraged from theistic explanations at every turn of
their education, this would have negative effects on them since they are not being taught
what is natural to them. The negative effects of imposing naturalism on children could be
catalogued or measured with a quantitative study. This study would predict that children
experience recurring cognitive dissonance when presented with naturalistic explanations.
While children may ultimately conform to reasoning about the world in a way that is not
natural to them, they will experience cognitive pains or psychological harm along the
way. Such a study could, using conventional instruments, measure the dissonance,
anxiety, or stress children experience when presented with explanations that conflict with
their existing cognitions. It would also consider the hypothesis that children may have a
difficult time letting go of theistic explanations and this may lead to disengagement in the
educational process. A longitudinal study could investigate whether these negative
effects are recurring or lasting.
A qualitative study, on the other hand, could investigate the positive effects of
encouraging children’s intuitive theism. It would first seek to understand children’s
experience of coming to theistic explanations, i.e., it would focus on their own experience
of their explanations. Where children feel their understanding of God comes from would
also be important to consider since the research suggests it does not originate from their
parents (Evans, 2000, 2001). Encouraging “animism” and “magical thinking” as
teleological or spiritual thinking may also mean that children will be more engaged,
enthusiastic, or energized by their educational experiences. Perhaps the curriculums of
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some sectarian schools do not discourage theistic thinking as much, so the educational
experiences of children from these schools could be investigated for themes of
engagement or enthusiasm. Perhaps children learn better and are more engaged when
their intuitions are encouraged and rewarded. Does encouraging intuitive theism also
impact other areas of children’s lives? These are all topics that a theistic approach to
research could seriously investigate, rather than asserting the conventional logic that
children’s intuitive thinking be supplanted (Kelemen, 2004).
Process: Revelational epistemology. The other aspect of cognitive
development—the process behind knowledge acquisition—could be similarly
reconceptualized and rendered into a theistic program of research. Because cognitive
development is typically assumed to occur through natural (immanent) processes, as
Piaget’s theory suggests, the epistemology with which it is associated considers
knowledge something children construct within themselves based on their interactions
with the world. In other words, a constructionist epistemology undergirds his theory
(Harris & Koenig, 2006). Learning, in this regard, is a fundamentally internal activity
through which children construct knowledge on their own based on their experiences.
From this perspective, children are endowed with biological and cognitive mechanisms
and structures that allow them to construct or incorporate knowledge. Knowledge, in
other words, is not something that is revealed to them, and it is only through their
capacity that they are able to learn. Although their environment influences what they can
learn, they have to bring in or accede to what is afforded to them, which implies they are
self-contained learners.
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Reconceptualization. A theistic reconceptualization of epistemology would view
knowledge not only as something constructed within the self but that could also be given
by God. In other words, instead of only considering a constructivist epistemology that
operates within the “isolated, encapsulated self” (Melling, 2013, p. 106), knowledge
could also originate “from a divine source that exists beyond the limits of self” (O’Grady
& Richards, 2011, p. 360). When children experience sudden or effortless insights or say
they came up with something they never would have thought of on their own (O’Grady &
Richards, 2011), this could be considered revelation, or knowledge that is given by God.
An epistemology based on divine revelation would not view the self as detached from
God, and cognitive development would be a process within which God is actively
involved. Indeed, God may not only prompt people to action in the spiritual sense, as if
God could only be active in a different, non-psychological realm, but may also enlighten
people’s cognitive understandings (Melling, 2013). Furthermore, revelation need not be
understood solely in terms of irregularities, e.g., special revelation. Revelation could also
be understood as an epistemological regularity which people experience as they routinely
explore and study God’s world in their daily lives. God could be actively prompting
them with insights or inspiration in response to their queries, perhaps even frequently
without their conscious awareness; actively petitioning God for knowledge may also have
different consequences.
The key difference between the conventional constructivist epistemology
undergirding Piaget’s theory and this theistic revelational epistemology is that the latter is
necessarily relational while the former is atomistic. In a general sense, no theistic
conception can do without relationality because people are necessarily related to God and
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essentially constituted by God’s activity, meaning they are not self-contained as typically
thought by psychologists.10 This would suggest, in the case of epistemology, that the self
is not sufficient to acquiring knowledge, since God would at least be a necessary
contributor, authority, and source of knowledge. Meaningful learning is more a
“betweenness” than a “withinness.” It is not so much “within the brain” as it is “between
God and man”—a relational learning rather than an incorporation. In this sense, a
learning theory based on a revelational epistemology would consider learning a joint
enterprise rather than a single enterprise, as dependent on God rather than independent of
God; while the self moderates what is learned from either perspective, a theistic learning
theory posits a self that is in necessary relation to a teaching and truthful God rather in
relation with itself in the form of a self-contained learner. It means that the truth cannot
be learned unless it is done in relation to God; from a theistic perspective, humans alone
cannot advance meaningful learning or truth. Real knowledge, in other words, is only
gained in relation to God. A revelational epistemology is not concerned with exactly
how God is involved in knowledge acquisition, however; it simply assumes that God is
involved, allowing researchers to consider the difference this makes in investigating
cognitive processes and learning (Slife et al., 2004; Melling, 2013).
Research. The theistic notion of a revelational epistemology for cognitive
development would lead to some new research hypotheses and studies that have not been
proposed and do not make sense under the conventional, widely accepted constructivist
epistemology. A quantitative study could explore whether children are more likely to
10

The necessary relationality behind theism will be developed and discussed at greater
length in the next major section of this chapter in contrast with its ontological
counterpart, abstractionism.
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learn from theistic content than naturalistic content. Recall that young children may
innately understand the world in theistic and teleological ways but are expected to replace
these understandings with naturalistic and mechanistic explanations. Instead of assuming
that the reason young children are naturally inclined toward one set of explanations is that
their self-contained ability to construct is undeveloped or immature, a theistic
reconceptualization of the epistemological process behind the content would suggest that
children are prompted by God in what they come to know or understand. Children, in
this sense, learn in relation to God’s implanted revelation and this should be fostered
rather than replaced. Therefore, a learning theory based on this revelational epistemology
would predict that children learn better what they already know, not unlike Rychlak’s
logical learning theory (Rychlak, 1986). It would predict that children attend to, engage
with, and learn from theistic explanations (i.e., animism and magical thinking, or
teleological or spiritual thinking) in an organic way. An experiment based on these
predictions could compare two groups of similar children on their ability to learn the
specific details of stories containing content that is beyond the grasp of their expected
abilities. One group would be told a story involving difficult theistic or spiritual
explanations of some events while the other group would be told the naturalistic
equivalent of that story. Children from the first group should not only show greater
engagement with the story but also be able to learn more details despite the two stories
being equally difficult to understand because of the organically theistic revelational
epistemology that informs the way they learn.
A qualitative study could investigate the particular experience of a revelational
epistemology, especially the experience of theistic ruptures. As Melling (2013) put it,
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ruptures “are those acts of God in which new ideas, concepts, or cognitions are impressed
upon the mind in an almost shocking or overwhelming manner. They are given by God
in the sense that they are not considered the sort of thoughts that humans would have
come up with naturally on their own…” (p. 100). It would be valuable to understand how
people’s experience of ruptures is different to their experience of constructions. Since
ruptures can come suddenly or surprisingly (Melling, 2013), the particular circumstances
in which ruptures may occur as well as the ways in which people are sensitive toward
them would also be important considerations in this qualitative investigation, not to
mention how people respond to them and the resulting consequences. This research
could also explore whether technical rationality (Slife, Johnson & Jennings, in press)
desensitizes people to ruptures or surprises. Since professional methods endorse the
predictability of technical rationality, they undermine the importance of practical
rationality that embraces unpredictability, surprise, ruptures, and openness to theistic
promptings. Because a revelational epistemology emphasizes the features of practical
relationality, it would be appropriate to investigate how people become open to
unpredictability and outside promptings in professional settings actively discouraging
such openness.
Spiritual Development
I just illustrated how a theistic approach to psychological research could impact
the investigation of a traditionally secular topic such as cognitive development. Now the
task is to show how a traditionally theistic topic within the subdiscipline of
developmental psychology can be investigated under a theistic worldview. Some may
wonder though why theistic topics even need to be reconceptualized theistically when
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they already seem inclined toward theism. Recall that while theistic topics are drawn
from theistic contexts, “systematic biases against a theistic interpretative framework have
led the discipline to avoid considering theism in the formulation and interpretation of
psychological theories and research, even when that research is focused on seemingly
theistic topics” (Slife & Reber, 2009a, p. 72). This means that even traditionally theistic
topics have themselves not been conceptualized and investigated in theistic ways. Thus,
the purpose of this section is to show how a traditionally theistic topic of developmental
psychology has not been conceptualized theistically and how a theistic
reconceptualization could lead to new and different studies of that same topic.
Within developmental psychology, the area of spiritual development has emerged
in recent years, garnering serious attention as an important facet of human development
that requires further understanding (Roehlkepartain et al., 2005; Boyatzis, 2005). While
many of the specific concepts and constructs studied under spiritual development seem to
be derived from or associated with traditionally theistic topics, developmental
psychologists have generally exhibited a tendency to understand and study these topics
naturalistically. The consensus, in other words, is “to define spirituality without explicit
reference to a sacred or transcendent realm” (Roehlkepartain et al., 2005, p. 5) because
“notions of divinity, God, or gods are not essential for spiritual development” (p. 9).
While those studying spiritual development might acknowledge theism’s relevance in a
particular religious domain, e.g., religious people understanding spiritual development in
theistic ways, they would claim that their consensus to specifically avoid theism is based
on a scientific approach that is neutral toward all forms of spirituality (see Chapter 1).
This approach is not really neutral toward theism, however; it is influenced by a
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naturalistic tendency that forbids theism, which is a preference enacted prior to
investigation and not as a result of investigation (again, the influence of naturalism’s bad
monopoly).
Space constraints prohibit a full review of the spiritual development literature, so
my focus will be on perhaps the most well-known and well-examined conception in this
area: James Fowler’s theory of faith development. Fowler’s theory has shaped the
landscape of spiritual development, resulting in many programs of research (e.g., Leak,
Loucks & Bowlin, 1999; Leak, 2003, 2008), and as a consequence it has “put the study of
religion, spirituality, and faith on a serious developmental footing” (King & Roeser,
2009, p. 446; see also Roehlkepartain et al., 2005). This is also partly because his faith
development theory is strongly influenced by the seminal developmental stage theories of
Piaget (cognitive), Erikson (psychosocial), and Kohlberg (moral) (Bridges & Moore,
2002; King & Roeser, 2009). Since Fowler’s theory is in some sense an amalgam of
these pivotal developmental theories, it serves as a bridge to developmental psychology
at large. Therefore, focusing on Fowler also allows me to address some broader,
mainstream developmental conventions and conceptions.
But perhaps the most important reason to explore Fowler’s faith development
theory in the present context is it already seems as though it is a theistic theory and
perhaps may be one of the most traditionally theistic conceptions of spiritual
development, in this regard (King & Roeser, 2009). Because it displays what appears
like openness to theistic content and meanings (Jardine & Viljoen, 1992), many will think
that it is already conceptualized and investigated theistically. I will show why this is not
so, while also laying out how his theory can be reconceptualized theistically. Following
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this, I will sketch some implications of this reconceptualization for quantitative and
qualitative research.
Fowler’s faith development theory. Fowler’s theory traces the progression of
people’s faith across their lifespan through six developmental stages (Fowler, 1981;
Nelson, 2009). Instead of describing each of these specific stages in detail, I will focus
on the overall shape of Fowler’s theory while drawing on select stages to illustrate certain
points. The beginning stages of Fowler’s theory suggest that faith is based on stories told
to children, which are understood in literal ways. When taken literally, the symbols in
these stories are considered misunderstood (Fowler, 1981). As children become
adolescents and young adults, they develop a system of tacit beliefs without reflection
and have difficulty seeing outside their own boxes. In the prime of adulthood, however,
one’s beliefs can be subject to reflection; tacit beliefs can be explicated and critically
examined (Nelson, 2009; Fowler, 1981). People often become disillusioned with their
beliefs at this stage when they realize there are other viable belief systems than their own.
Therefore, instead of taking literally the symbols of the stories on which beliefs are
based, people begin to demythologize these stories as they move toward “transcendence”
based on the meaning of these stories (Fowler, 1981). In later life, people may achieve
this transcendence and see the ultimate meaning of these stories as pointing to a life of
sacrifice for the sake of the helpless.
While this characterization of faith development by Fowler (1981) might involve
religious stories of God, the realization that people of advanced faith will inevitably come
to, according to the theory, is that God is not literal. That is to say, the “human quest for
relation to transcendence” (p. 14) is not shaped by anything distinctly theistic, and the
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“vision of transcendent value and power, one’s ultimate concern” (p. 14) to which a
person of faith is oriented is not that of a real divine being. Rather, faith is focused “in a
center or centers of value, and on images and realities of power. In faith we find
coherence for our lives through allegiance to an emerging, conscious master story or
stories” (Fowler, 1991, p. 33, emphasis added). What is “transcendent” is rooted in these
master stories, and thus faith is something developed entirely on the basis of these stories.
These stories are not revelatory stories given by God to humanity designed to help people
understand their lives. This means that even when stories include God, people construct
them, and God does not contribute to or participate in the meanings of these stories or the
influence they have on people in any active way because, as somebody who progresses
through the faith stages successfully will come to realize, the God in these stories is not a
literal God. The clear implication is any sophisticated person should understand that God
is not to be taken literally.
Thus, Fowler really only considers that “faith is based in our sense of self that
develops on several levels” (Nelson, 2009, p. 232), i.e., based on the reality of the person
rather than the reality of God. Faith is not something that is co-developed with an active
God in the meaning of the story or alongside the story, as theism entails, and when a
story has a ring of truth to it, that truth does not come from God. Rather, faith is wholly
contingent on the interplay of master stories (which themselves only have a metaphorical
God within them) with the self, making God simply one of many “shared centers of value
and power” (Fowler, 1996, p. 21) and only as influential toward a person’s faith as the
master story featuring God’s depiction as a fictional character of power and value in that
story, which is all God can ever be in the framework of Fowler’s theory. In this sense,
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God could be a center of that value and power but it is not a real God so much as a God
constructed by the self at various stages of development. Fowler does not postulate that a
real God interacts with and perhaps changes master stories because the self is the only
agent of those stories. Not only is this is at odds with the theistic understanding that God
could be the agent of these stories; it also implies that all master stories that inform a
person’s faith are ultimately sourced in the self. God in no way participates, acts, or has a
real contribution to the stories through which people achieve transcendence, which itself
is not the conventional theistic notion [of transcendence] many religions accept.
Theistic reconceptualization. Fowler’s theory is framed in a way that does not
take theistic influences into account in the development of one’s faith (Loder & Fowler,
1982; Conn, 1998; McDargh, 2001); therefore, a theistic reconceptualization of his theory
would, from the beginning, consider God to be actively involved in people’s faith
development throughout their lives. Perhaps the clearest way to illustrate the
implications of such a reconceptualization is to identify the abstractionist tendencies that
inform his theory and to contrast them with the relational sensibilities of a theistic
reconceptualization of his theory (Slife, 2004b). For the purposes of this section, these
abstractionist tendencies include an emphasis on the contextless, the universal, and the
self as fundamental reality; a relational understanding, by contrast, considers the
contextual, the particular, and the relationship to be what is more fundamentally real and
meaningful (Slife, 2004b). Fowler’s abstractionist inclinations are present in 1. the way
he standardizes faith, 2. his contrast of Stage 4 individuative-reflective faith to earlier
stages, and 3. his humanistic interpretation of Stage 6 universalizing faith. In this section,
I will describe how the abstractionism characterizing these three approaches is not
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acceptable within a theistic worldview, while illustrating theistic reconceptualizations
that could be applied to each of these approaches based on relationality.
Fowler’s theory considers that faith is developed fundamentally the same across
all people and contexts, no matter how qualitatively different specific versions of faith
may appear to one another. Faith in one’s God, in this sense, is considered no different
than faith in one’s family or country, for example. This results in the standardization of
faith, which is an abstractionist tendency because it takes faith out of its specific contexts
and regards all forms of faith as a generic kind of faith. Faith development is therefore
viewed as a universal phenomenon guided by the same processes for everybody, none of
which processes include God; even faith that is centered on God is ultimately a function
of these godless processes. Instead of standardizing theistic faith into some generic
version of faith development, which Fowler’s theory does (McDargh, 2001; Jardine &
Viljoen, 1992), a relational reconceptualization would recognize that theistic faith has
unique aspects that cannot be realized in any other form of faith, and therefore cannot be
properly understood outside of its particular theistic context, such as, according to Loder,
“the function of faith in giving certainty to existence, faith as participation in the
omnipotence of God, faith as salvific power, [and] faith as concrete experience of
transcendent realities” (Jardine & Viljoen, 1992, p. 75). To consider the theistic context
of faith seriously also means that instead of being solely sourced in the self, faith is a real
relationship with God. This would mean that God’s influence on the faith of theists who
welcome that involvement is likely greater than or at least different from those who resist
that influence. A theistic reconceptualization will take these potential differences into
account rather than treat the developmental processes behind all versions of faith the
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same way for everyone as if God is not involved in these processes for anyone. It would
consider that God meaningfully ministers to people in ways suited to their particular
circumstances. In this sense, theistic faith is fluid rather than fixed.
The contrast between Stage 4 individuative-reflective faith of Fowler’s theory
with earlier stages is also characterized by abstractionism. Stage 4 suggests that
advanced faith involves subjecting one’s own beliefs to critical examination rather than
simply accepting these beliefs dogmatically (Fowler, 1981). The earlier stages of
Fowler’s theory are consistent with a parochial faith while Stage 4 moves away from
what is viewed as a restricted faith. Stage 4 begins to move toward a more universal
perspective that, instead of being captured by particular local traditions, notions of
absolute truth, or dogmatism, is concerned with a relativist approach to truth where each
person’s beliefs, no matter how different, are universally validated. This move from the
local to the general, the particular to the universal, and from closedmindedness to
openmindedness is ultimately a progression from relationality to abstractionism. A
relational and theistic reconceptualization, on the other hand, would consider that one
need not depart from one’s beliefs and be less confirmed in one’s dogma to achieve an
advanced faith. Faith, in the theistic sense, would be less about one’s beliefs than about
one’s relationship with God (e.g., sanctification). The main issue, in other words, is
whether beliefs foster a relationship with God; for the relationist, beliefs are a means, not
an end. Therefore, theistic faith moves from abstraction to concreteness, the universal to
the particular, openmindedness to loving closedmindedness, and from beliefs to
relationship.
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A third manifestation of the abstractionism in Fowler’s theory concerns his
humanistic interpretation of Stage 6 universalizing faith. Stage 6 faith is supposed to
embody the acceptance of a universal human community in which one should live for the
sake of serving others (Nelson, 2009). The universal human community represents
perhaps the ultimate abstraction because it is a commitment to a contextless principle or
ideal. The service rendered toward others, from this perspective, is based on a
commitment to some universal principle; it is not a relationship with God that makes the
service meaningful, or even a relationship with the people being served. This kind of
service serves the self’s abstraction rather one’s relationship with God. A theistic
reconceptualization would render service meaningful because it is done out of gratitude
for God and therefore in humility and submission to God’s will. This commitment to a
fairly concrete relationship with a divine other is not an abstraction or a way to serve the
self. Rather, the very capacity to serve God and others comes from God, as does the
source of one’s love for others and inspiration concerning how they should be served.
Quantitative research. Quantitative studies that adopt some of these theistic
reconcpetualizations of Fowler’s theory of faith development could investigate several
new hypotheses regarding some of his stages that would not be apparent within the
abstractionist bounds of his theory. I will consider one such study for Stage 4 and then
another for Stage 6. First, instead of limiting the investigation of faith development to
scales that focus on merely the “narcissistically-tinged introspectiveness, distancing, and
criticalness that operate primarily within a cognitive realm of beliefs” (Leak et al., 1999,
p. 122) of Stage 4, such as the Faith Development Scale (Leak et al., 1999; Leak, 2003,
2008), it could also be investigated with scales such as a closeness to God or
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sanctification scale that reflects one’s relationship with God. The Clergy Spiritual Wellbeing Scale (Proeschold-Bell et al., 2014), for example, is one such scale that could be
adapted to exploring the faith not simply of those in religious professions but also the
faith of people in general, and it could even be altered in ways to allow closeness to God
to be measured among those who do not profess an obvious theistic faith. Other
conventional measures such as the Daily Spiritual Experience Scale (Underwood &
Teresi, 2002) and the Faith Maturity Scale (Benson, Donahue & Erickson, 1993) could be
similarly adapted. It could be that people feel close to God whether they are selfidentified theists or not, and whether they know it or not. In other words, people may be
in touch with God but may not use the standard religious rhetoric to express their
experiences, so it would be important to introduce a scale that is sensitive to this theistic
possibility.
Another quantitative study could explore the differences in humility and
motivation in those considered to be characterized by two different forms of Stage 6
faith: the Fowlerian conception and the theistic reconceptualization. It would
hypothesize that those attaining to Fowler’s basically humanistic conception would differ
from those of the theistic reconceptualization in that the former is ultimately a way of
serving the self (or the abstracted self, a sophisticated egoism), while the latter is
constituted by motivations that are centered on one’s relationship with God, perhaps a
true altruism. Because humility is defined by a relatively low focus on the self and a
genuine desire to serve others (Powers et al., 2007; Elliott, 2010), one would expect those
who serve theistically to score higher on a humility scale, such as the Humility Scale
(Elliott, 2010) or the Relational Humility Scale (Davis et al., 2011), than those who serve
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humanistically (and thus abstractly). As Elliott (2010) put it, humility is concerned with
how people “relate to their God, as well as how they are to relate with others” (p. 5),
suggesting that humility is a relational construct suited to differentiating between those
who serve for higher motivations that extend outside of themselves from those who serve
others ultimately for themselves. In the latter case, for instance, one might only serve
people one deems as “deserving” according to the humanistic principle of social justice
that is frequently associated with universalizing faith (Harrist & Richardson, 2012).
Although social justice may also be the concern of theists, they would understand it
somewhat differently. Their service would be characterized as more particular and
meaningful since one is directed to the particular needs of particular people by humbly
submitting to a loving God’s will. This may mean that one is directed to serving people
who other people think do not need serving, such as those who might be thought to
contribute to social injustices.
Qualitative research. Similarly, qualitative studies could be designed based on
the theistic reconceptualzations of both Stage 4 and Stage 6. In the first instance, a
qualitative study could explore people’s experience of their theistic faith without
standardizing it into some generic version of faith that is closed off to theistic meanings.
As people’s faith deepens, they may grow closer to God in the sense of sanctification,
and qualitative research could be distinctly attuned to meanings that consider faith as a
theistic relationship. The relationship would also be very particular and ultimately
grounded in the specific context of the person with whom God ministers to and relates
with. This would mean what while some meanings may be common across different
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people’s experiences of God in their lives, other meanings will be very unique and
distinct.
The theistic notion of kenosis is another avenue for qualitative investigation.
Kenosis is a different conceptualization of Stage 6 of Fowler’s theory compared to the
standard humanistic conception, inasmuch as living for the sake of others in submission
to God’s will results in the emptying of oneself for the fulfillment of God’s purposes, i.e.,
kenosis (Nelson, 2009; Sorenson, 2004). This makes kenosis, or “self-emptying” one’s
own will to fulfill God’s will, especially suited to some theistic meanings. Qualitative
research could therefore explore the depth of the theistic meanings that consume people
who experience kenosis. A qualitative study could recruit participants who have
experienced kenosis and employ semi-structured interviews to understand the role God
plays in their lives and why their faith in God mobilizes them to a life of selfless service,
while keeping the theistic core of kenosis intact (Slife et al., 2012). Interview questions
might specifically examine the source of the capacity for self-emptying. Since kenosis
implies that this capacity is rooted in divine purposes, theistic meanings of self-emptying
could be investigated. This self-emptying would be viewed in the context of humbly
submitting to God’s will, which serves and strengthens one’s relationship with God.
Participants’ receptivity to God’s will could be explored along with their capacity to selfempty, specifically in reference to their motivations for serving others selflessly and the
feelings they have toward those they serve. They would be expected to have a strong
capacity to love others since they have emptied themselves, and their meanings and
motivations for service would be very different to those derived from humanistic values.
How might they, for example, experience God to be present in their service?
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Participants’ responses could be coded and a grounded theory approach could be applied
to generate a theistic model of faith development based on kenosis.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to show that both the secular and theisticallyassociated topics within a particular subdiscipline of psychology can be reconceptualized
theistically in ways that lead to new and different research questions, hypotheses, and
predictions, as well as original theistic studies and prospective programs of research.
While the exemplars I provided are not fully developed studies or programs, they clearly
seem to indicate that theism is heuristic, capable of generating new hypotheses and
instruments, and that is has the potential to advance new theories. Furthermore, my use
of cognitive development (a traditionally secular topic) and spiritual development (a
traditionally theistic topic) within developmental psychology (a secular psychological
subdiscipline) along with quantitative and qualitative methods shows that theism has
direct implications for the existing topics and methods of psychological science.
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A Viable Theistic Program of Psychological Research is Possible
Circling back to the original and overarching question of this thesis, it should now
be clear that not only is a viable theistic program of psychological research possible; it is
also necessary. The explorations undertaken in the first two chapters of this thesis point
to this necessity, providing the rationale for considering the title question as well as the
justification for illustrating a theistic program of psychological research. The next two
chapters showed how such a program could look, demonstrating the very real possibility
of some prospective, practical programs and studies. While I only sketched a few
prospective programs of research using a theistic approach to developmental psychology,
I could have gone about this task with several other subdisciplines of psychology equal to
the prospect. Time and space limitations prohibited a more extensive presentation.
Future directions would include illustrating additional prospective programs of research
in other psychological subdisciplines and more importantly carrying out these programs.
The purpose of conceptualizing and carrying out theistic programs of
psychological research is not to create another bad monopoly situation, with naturalistic
research being replaced wholesale by theistic research. Rather, a theistic approach to
psychological research represents a commitment to the principles that guide a scientific
marketplace, with scientific ideas evolving through fair competition. Perhaps most
importantly, such a marketplace thrives on a dialectic through which competitors are
inextricably related to one another through contrast. This means that a theistic program
of research makes sense only in relation to its contrasting naturalistic competition, and
vice versa. Psychological science can therefore never be complete without embracing a
dialectical marketplace to which theistic research contributes.
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